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International carbon markets have evolved considerably from the Kyoto Pro-
tocol’s flexible mechanisms to the Paris Agreement’s cooperative mechanism 
and approaches. With the conception of Article 6 under the Paris Agreement, 
Parties to the UNFCCC have significantly changed the modalities in which 
international cooperation (through market and non-market approaches) 
takes place. The change is driven by the context and spirit of the Paris Agree-
ment. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, that relied on a uniform emissions 
budget approach for industrialized countries, all countries under the Paris 
Agreement have adopted national commitments to reduce greenhouse gases 
but lack a common approach to defining the target. 
In addition, the framing of international cooperation under the Paris regime 
reflects the desire of many Parties to give greater responsibility to the par-
ticipating countries in designing their cooperative schemes, to move beyond 
the crediting of single mitigation projects to transformative and sector-based 
cooperation, and to redefine international cooperation as a tool to enhance 
mitigation ambition. At the same time, Parties need to create workable solu-
tions for preventing the heightened risk of double counting of mitigation 
outcomes between countries and for ensuring environmental integrity in the 
context of heterogeneous mitigation targets.  
Over the last negotiations rounds, Parties have made significant progress in 
defining these new carbon market rules. Yet, while at COP24 in Katowice Par-
ties were able to agree on the Paris Rulebook, the finalization of the Article 
6 rules is still pending and has been postponed to COP25 in Chile. Carbon 
markets therefore remain in limbo, with the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms hav-
ing lost their incentive function and the Paris Agreement’s mechanism and 
approaches still not being operational. However, this period of uncertainty 
has given rise to a number of initiatives that aim to test or prepare for the 
new rules. As negotiators continue to grapple with the technical intricacies of 
the rules, these Article 6 pilot initiatives can offer vital insights. 
In this study, we provide the first comprehensive overview of about a dozen 
ongoing Article 6 pilots supported through bilateral channels, regional orga-
nizations and multilateral development banks. We analyze the emerging 
trends and early experience with Article 6 implementation and look partic-
ularly at how the pilots are responding to the new challenges posed by the 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Paris Agreement – including the heightened role of governments in the coop-
eration, the relationship of the cooperation with NDC commitments, the need 
for tracking and accounting of ITMOs, challenges related to the determination 
of additionality and the baseline in the Paris regime, and the focus on sustain-
able development and an overall mitigation in global emissions. We see that 
today’s pilots are already addressing these challenges in their engagement 
with partners while coming up with a host of different approaches. These 
early experiences can serve as an important reference point for negotiators. 
The analysis in the study is based on an in-depth examination of the individ-
ual pilots. 
The activities we present as pilots in this study represent the diversity of 
approaches that can be pursued under Article 6. As there is no definition or 
common understanding of what an Article 6 pilot actually is, we apply a num-
ber of indicators that jointly identify the relevant activities. A strong indication 
first and foremost, is whether the stakeholders involved describe their activ-
ity as such. Furthermore, we include initiatives that are designed to support 
or test out specific aspects of international cooperation, or are implemented 
in anticipation of future transactions of mitigation outcomes. While offering 
a first selection of Article 6 pilot activities, the study does not claim the right 
to an exclusive definition, nor pretend to be exhaustive. Rather, it seeks to 
provide readers with a comprehensive picture of real-world initiatives trying 
to operationalize Article 6.  
The study consolidates some observations from emerging Article 6 pilots cen-
tering on the following issues: 
Our analysis of the role of governments in Article 6 transactions shows 
that diversified contractual structures for ITMO transfer agreements emerge. 
At the same time, all pilots seek to avoid double counting of mitigation out-
comes and often seek to enhance the current ambition of NDCs. 
The relationship between the pilot activities and the NDC commitments 
of the host country is a relevant consideration for all stakeholders. Many 
pilots have arrangements in place that foresee the sharing of mitigation out-
comes so that both buyer and seller countries receive a portion of the emis-
sion reductions for their own NDC. Some pilots require proof that there is 
NDC “overachievement” before ITMOs can be transferred.
The pilots also contribute to building up capacity for tracking and account-
ing for ITMOs, which is the basis for sound NDC accounting. The current 
pilot initiatives often work towards national-level tracking, monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV), capacity and infrastructure through differ-
ent approaches, including registries and proposed methodologies for corre-
sponding adjustments. 
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Determining baselines and additionality often builds on the CDM’s method-
ological toolbox, but adds elements to take into account NDC-related policies 
and measures or long-term emission trajectories of the sector. We observe in 
the pilots a desire to both, simplify the use of methodologies and to preserve, 
and in some cases strengthen, environmental integrity. Given that not many 
specific baseline methodologies and additionality tests have been published 
by Article 6 pilot developers, it is not clear whether these aims can be reached 
at the same time. 
While sustainable development features prominently in the Paris Agree-
ment and in the agenda of the Article 6 negotiations, early indications from 
the Katowice texts suggest that the operationalization of the concept may not 
differ much from how it was operationalized under the CDM. Yet, with nota-
ble exceptions, sustainable development is a clear focus of many of today’s 
pilot activities. 
For the Article 6.4 mechanism, the contribution to an overall mitigation in 
global emissions is a key requirement, which does not apply to cooperative 
approaches under Article 6.2 (yet). Still, there is a broad range of concepts for 
how to operationalize overall mitigation, ranging from conservative baselines 
to sharing mitigation benefits with the host country to the cancellation of 
units. 
We hope that the practical initiatives to implement Article 6 activities, as well 
as the ongoing international climate negotiations that work towards a set of 
multilateral rules and guidance for Article 6, progress rapidly in 2019, also 
with regard to the publication of relevant information regarding their design 
and methodological approaches. Keeping in mind that carbon markets are 
not an objective in themselves, but shall serve as key policy instruments to 
deliver the ambition of the Paris Agreement through ambitious NDCs, such 
progress is urgently needed.
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1.  NAVIGATING THE NEW CARBON 
MARKET CONTEXT 
The Paris Agreement (PA) has established a long-term future for carbon mar-
kets through Article 6. Article 6 international market mechanisms, in con-
junction with domestic market-based policy instruments, are poised to play 
a central role in delivering the nationally determined contributions (NDC) of 
many countries. The central premise of these instruments is that they allow 
economically efficient greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to be harnessed 
through international cooperation, thereby enabling more ambitious climate 
action. At the same time, both international and domestic carbon markets 
have also been mired by controversy as their effectiveness and integrity 
depend on carefully crafted rules and compliance mechanisms. 
While multilateral rules have yet to be finalized, Article 6 is already moving 
toward conceptualizing and implementing practical pilot activities from which 
important early experiences and observations can be drawn.
This study provides a comprehensive overview of these ongoing Article 6 
pilots. To set the scene, we provide a brief overview of the evolution of car-
bon markets related to the UNFCCC process, followed by an update on the 
ongoing negotiations to finalize the Article 6-related aspects of the PA rule-
book. We then illustrate what types of pilot activities are emerging and reflect 
on their early experiences. An annex with factsheets providing key informa-
tion on all of the covered pilot activities concludes this study.
A.  THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
CARBON MARKETS
UNFCCC-backed carbon markets were first established by the Kyoto Proto-
col in the late 1990s. Three different international policy instruments were 
introduced that catered to the vastly different landscape of UNFCCC Party 
circumstances. Governments of industrialized countries could trade assigned 
amount units (AAUs) internationally. They could also use Joint Implementa-
tion (JI), a baseline-and-credit mechanism mainly focused on mitigation activ-
ities implemented in economies in transition. The Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM), on the other hand, enabled developing countries to engage 
in voluntary emissions reduction projects and sell the resulting emission 
reduction credits to Parties with Kyoto compliance obligations. The latter two 
mechanisms – JI and CDM – were also spurred by emission trading systems 
in industrialized countries building on Kyoto accounting rules, especially the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in Europe. Beyond generating 
tradable emission reduction certificates, the Kyoto mechanisms also pio-
neered a vast range of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) tools 
and engaged Parties without mitigation obligations into harmonized carbon 
accounting standards.
Moreover, these flexible mechanisms are also intended to stimulate sus-
tainable development and have motivated the private sector to contribute 
to emission reduction efforts. The CDM has generated more than 10,000 
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mitigation activities1 in more than 100 countries. These have issued almost 
2 billion certified emission reductions (CERs), with an uncertain amount of 
further potential – depending on conditions such as demand and the degree 
to which activities covered by the CDM will transition into domestic compo-
nents of host country NDCs. The CDM has also continued to evolve from sup-
porting single projects to programmatic approaches, a significant degree and 
standardization in the methodological toolkit, as well as pioneering linkages 
with results-based climate finance beyond offsetting. These reforms led to 
tangible results, for instance, by enabling access to the CDM for household 
and community level activities with high sustainable development impacts, 
and, as a result, a stronger participation by least developed countries (LDCs) 
and African countries.
Still, the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 and the long time it 
subsequently took to negotiate a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, 
as well as criticisms of the Kyoto Mechanisms, led to a prolonged phase of 
uncertainty about the future relevance of carbon market instruments beyond 
2020. From 2013 on, demand for credits from the Kyoto mechanisms was 
so low that the market essentially stalled. This was both due to perceived 
shortcomings of the Kyoto Mechanisms, which resulted in a closure of the 
emissions trading systems for Kyoto credits, as well as the uncertain situation 
of the international climate policy regime. 
The World Bank developed the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) 
and the Pilot Auction Facility (PAF) to provide “lifelines” to market niches in 
low income countries and for activities that were particularly threatened to 
be discontinued due to the market crisis. Moreover, the Partnership for Mar-
ket Readiness (PMR) was also established to accelerate the introduction of 
domestic market mechanisms that could eventually become drivers for inter-
national carbon markets as well as spur domestic demand for project-based 
emission reductions. Japan developed its own mechanism, the Joint Crediting 
Mechanism (JCM) as a blueprint for a new market mechanism under a more 
bottom-up international regime.
Kyoto Mechanisms
Paris mechanism 
and approaches
The gap: preserving market niches 
and testing bottom-up approaches
Figure 1
The evolution of carbon market approaches (Source: Authors)
1 Counting both single projects and the 
component project activities of CDM 
Programme of Activities (UNEP DTU 2019)
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The next phase of carbon markets will be governed by the PA. While the Kyoto 
Protocol set binding emission reduction commitments only for developed 
countries, the PA establishes a more comprehensive approach as it requires all 
countries to contribute to global mitigation efforts and to regularly communi-
cate their own nationally determined climate pledges. This pledge-and-review 
system provides the flexibility needed for all countries to contribute under a 
centralized transparency framework and track progress on climate action. 
This also means that countries cannot continue to freely transfer all of their 
emission reductions abroad. Instead, each country must transparently eval-
uate what would constitute a fair contribution to the global mitigation effort 
and how much will be retained for their own NDC achievement. Also, all Par-
ties can potentially sell and buy emission reduction credits and units through 
the approaches for voluntary cooperation established in Article 6 of the 
Agreement. 
Article 6 gives countries the option to generate and trade internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) through decentralized cooperative 
approaches under Article 6.2, participate in a UNFCCC-governed mechanism 
defined in Article 6.4 (the successor to the CDM), and collaborate through 
non-market approaches under Article 6.8. 
B.  ARTICLE 6 NEGOTIATIONS:  
WHERE DO WE STAND?
The main outcome of the 24th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
(COP24) that Parties hoped for and worked towards was a comprehensive 
Paris Rulebook that would guide countries in their implementation of the PA. 
While Parties reached their goal – producing the so-called Katowice Climate 
Package2  – Article 6 remains the only agenda item to not make its way into 
the rulebook. This is not to say that Article 6 negotiators did not make any 
progress. In fact, Parties worked diligently through a long list of issues and 
reached landing grounds on many of them. The progress has been captured 
in two sets of documents elaborated during the session: The draft texts on 
Article 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 agreed by Subsidiary Body meeting (SBSTA 49) at the 
end of the technical negotiations and the textual proposals on the three 
agenda items by the Katowice presidency for and during ministerial consul-
tations. A third text, in which the presidency had removed all brackets in the 
Article 6 texts was not agreed by Parties and has no formal standing. On the 
basis of which text Parties will continue to engage in the next round of nego-
tiations during SBSTA 50 has as yet to be decided.
In the draft texts from SBSTA and the Katowice presidency, Parties tenta-
tively agreed on a number of issues, including the guidance for correspond-
ing adjustments, reporting and review requirements for the cooperative 
approaches under Article 6.2, baseline and additionality approaches, a set of 
options for how Article 6.4 will deliver overall mitigation in global emissions 
(OMGE), as well as much of the work program for the Article 6.8 framework 
for non-market approaches.3
2 UNFCCC. Katowice Climate Package. 
December 15, 2018
3 UNFCCC. The Katowice Texts: Proposal by 
the President. December, 2018
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Parties, however, continuously faced a number of stumbling blocks that left 
Article 6 with no formal consensus as to the role of carbon markets and inter-
national cooperation within the context of the PA. Accounting of international 
transfers under the Article 6.4 centralized mechanism and issues regarding 
double counting remain highly contentious. Other issues, such as the transi-
tion of CDM projects, credits and methodologies to Article 6.4, the share of 
proceeds for adaptation levied through Article 6.4 and the eligibility of REDD+ 
activities under Article 6, also remain open. 
While agreement on the final rules of Article 6 was postponed to COP25 in 
Chile, substantial progress needs to be made in the meantime to maintain 
momentum and provide the clarity needed for countries and the private sec-
tor to kick-start international cooperation that can incentivize countries to 
enhance NDC ambition by 2020. 
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PILOTING?
On this basis, it is clear that there is no time to waste in increasing NDC ambi-
tion from Parties. Article 6 pilots can play an instrumental role in this process. 
To pilot means to test a concept, scheme or project before it can formally be 
implemented or introduced on a wider scale. Article 6 pilots can therefore 
test and experiment with the concepts of international market mechanisms 
emerging from the climate negotiations and, in turn, usefully inform these 
discussions with experiences made and early lessons learned. 
In addition, pilots that achieve fast implementation harness transactional 
experience, allowing countries (and stakeholders) to better understand the 
emission and economic implications of their own targets and how these can 
be optimally achieved. Pilots not only reinforce existing international envi-
ronmental cooperation between countries, but also provide an excellent lab-
oratory for understanding where cooperation is most needed and align seller 
and buyer interests early-on. 
Article 6 pilots can also trailblaze the way for increasing private sector involve-
ment by experimenting with different forms of allocating incentives and 
channeling climate finance. This may be achieved in different ways, including 
overarching bilateral agreements – within which the private sector operates 
with greater predictability over GHG accounting and the prevention of double 
counting – as well as through building up domestic capacities for national 
authorizations of activities and the export of ITMOs. 
Given this, various initiatives and activities have already been launched to 
investigate this process and gain a head-start on preparing for carbon mar-
kets under the PA as well as for implementing NDC. In the next sections we 
examine the piloting landscape to provide an overview of these activities 
and initiatives. We also observe what trends are materializing and what can 
be learned from these, as well as how they can influence, function within or 
incorporate the emerging Article 6 guidance.    
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2. THE PILOTING LANDSCAPE
A flurry of activities can already be observed, with an increasing number 
of actors presenting their initiatives at various conferences and events. At 
the same time, many pilot implementers are cautious of fully disclosing the 
details of their activities or even associating these directly with Article 6. 
There is also no definition or common understanding of what an Article 6 
pilot actually is. Just as the types of cooperation under Article 6 can differ 
widely – on the basis of individual CDM-like mitigation activities, sector-wide 
policies and measures in host countries or linking countries’ climate policy 
instruments – various aspects can comprise an Article 6 pilot. Whether an 
activity can be characterized as a pilot may to a large extent lie in the eye of 
the beholder. A strong indication, first and foremost, is if the stakeholders 
involved describe their activity as such.  
For the purpose of the study we broadly define Article 6 pilots as those initia-
tives that have the potential to align themselves with, or qualify under Article 
6.2, Article 6.4 or Article 6.8 of the PA, respectively. This includes existing ini-
tiatives that predate the PA as well as new ones emerging post-PA. We apply 
a number of indicators that can help to categorize pilots as such: 
• The activity is presented as an Article 6 pilot by implementing entities.
•  The activity will likely be governed by Article 6 rules, once these rules are 
finalized. 
•  The activity is seeking to test the operationalization of relevant concepts 
under Article 64.
•  The activity directly builds capacities and prepares countries to participate 
in Article 6.
•  Participating countries or entities indicate their intention to eventually 
transfer or acquire ITMOs. 
PILOTS SELECTED IN THE STUDY 
Following this approach, we identify a number of initiatives that can be con-
sidered Article 6 pilots. Listed alphabetically below, according to the country 
or institution spearheading them, the following pilots have been developed 
by multilateral development banks (MDBs), countries, and regional financial 
institution. The selected pilots also form the basis for the analysis in chapter 
3 on the observation from the piloting phase with regards to key design ques-
tions discussed in the Article 6 negotiations. 
4 For example, transaction structures for 
transferring and acquiring ITMOs or the 
definition of additionality and baselines in the 
context of NDCs
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ARTICLE 6 PILOT ACTIVITIES
This selection of pilots is by no means exhaustive. Other pilot initiatives are 
also being developed, for which detailed information was not yet available 
during the finalization of the study or could not be shared with the authors 
due to the confidential nature of the information. 
While not formally classified as Article 6 pilots, other initiatives also exist 
that share similar goals and objectives and are certainly related to the Article 
6 debate. This includes for example, the international cooperation in mar-
ket mechanisms through the PMR or the Nitric Acid Climate Action Group 
(NACAG).  As well, we identify two other related initiatives that similarly are 
not deemed Article 6 pilots as such, but are relevant for the wider Article 6 
discussions. These include EU ETS-Swiss ETS linking and REDD+ activities. 
We note here that while the various cross-border links between cap and 
trade schemes (EU-Switzerland, California-Quebec) are not designed as pilot 
activities, they can trigger Article 6 collaboration. Countries planning these 
linkages pay close attention in the negotiations on Article 6 to ensure the 
rules, modalities and procedures do not prevent their linking efforts. The link-
ing of ETS requires an extensive amount of harmonization and institutional 
African Development Bank
The Adaptation Benefit 
Mechanism
Switzerland 
Pilot activities of the Climate Cent 
Foundation
Asian Development Bank
Article 6 Support Facility
Switzerland
ITMO purchase program of the 
KliK Foundation
Canada – Chile  
Program to reduce emissions in 
the waste sector
World Bank
The Standardized Crediting 
Framework
Japan 
The Joint Crediting Mechanism
World Bank
The Transformative Carbon Asset 
Facility
NEFCO – Peru
Cooperative arrangement pilot 
in the solid waste sector
World Bank
The Warehouse Facility
Swedish Energy Agency  
A virtual pilot study in Nigeria
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coordination, and the lessons learned are valuable for the operationalization 
of cooperative approaches. 
Currently, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD+) initiatives are not covered under Article 6. As the negotiations are 
not yet finalized, REDD+ could eventually be integrated into or aligned with 
Article 6 cooperative approaches. Therefore, we have included REDD+ into 
the discussion of this study.
OTHER RELEVANT INITIATIVES
WHERE ARE PILOTS LOCATED? 
To visualize the Article 6 pilots and related initiatives identified in our study, 
we have mapped the various countries and multilateral institutions that pro-
mote these as well as where their activities are located. 
WHEN DID THE ACTIVITIES  
AND PILOTS START?
In the context of this study we observe recently emerging activities that intend 
to be recognised as an Article 6 cooperative approach and long-standing ini-
tiatives that could eventually be recognized under Article 6 or are relevant as 
part of the Article 6 debate. While the former group developed more recently 
and with Article 6 in mind, the latter includes initiatives that were established 
prior to the PA and already have in place a cooperative structure that could 
fit under Article 6 should these initiatives wish to do so. It is also worth not-
ing that a number of the recently emerging initiatives derive, to a greater or 
lesser extent, from existing CDM and NAMA interventions in host countries. 
Table 1: Comparison of 
emergence of initiatives
Based on a study commissioned by 
the Nordic Initiative for Cooperative 
Approaches (NICA) on Article 6 Land-
scapes (prepared by Climate Focus)
Recently emerging 
Emerging (based on 
CDM/NAMAs) 
Predate the PA 
AfDB: ABM
Canada-Chile
Sweden: SEA Virtual 
Pilots*
World Bank: TCAF
World Bank: 
Warehouse
Switzerland: KLIK**
NEFCO: Peruvian 
waste sector
Sweden: SEA Virtual 
Pilots*
Switzerland: CCF***
World Bank: SCF
EU-Swiss ETS Link
Japan: JCM
REDD+ initiatives 
REDD+ initiatives 
EU and Switzerland 
ETS linking in the context of NDC 
targets
* Certain SEA virtual pilots build on existing CDM methodologies and activities, whereas others may 
propose new approaches.
** Focus is on new activities, but may also include stranded CDM activities.
*** Some CCF activities are based on existing NAMA interventions. Information from all activities is 
not yet available.
Figure 2
Based on a study commissioned by 
the Nordic Initiative for Cooperative 
Approaches (NICA) on Article 6 Land-
scapes (prepared by Climate Focus)
Costa Rica
Colombia
Senegal
Nigeria
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Maldives
Bangladesh Palau
Philippines
Myanmar
Cambodia
Laos
Thailand
Vietnam
Indonesia
Mongolia
Kenya
Peru
Chile
Mexico
EU & Switzerland Saudi Arabia
World Bank SCF
SELECTION OF ARTICLE 6 PILOT INITIATIVES
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WHAT IS THE PREDOMINANT FORM AND 
SCALE OF COOPERATION? 
All pilots identified in our study seem to adopt a baseline-and-crediting 
approach. We have not yet observed the emergence of any pilots that intend 
to trade ITMOs on metrics other than CO²e. The scale of intervention can 
vary considerably. While some pilots relate to policy setting and function on 
a large scale, other activities are sector specific or only focused on specific 
projects. This also relates to the type of crediting and baseline approaches 
the pilots adopt, whereby these can vary from project-by-project crediting to 
domestic standardized crediting and policy crediting.
WHICH ARTICLE 6 ROUTES  
ARE BEING PURSUED?
While at this stage a large number of pilots are instrument neutral, meaning 
they could fit under both Article 6.2 and/or Article 6.4, others have already 
expressed their intention to make use of Article 6.2 cooperative approaches. 
We have only identified one pilot that aims to fit under Article 6.8 non-market 
approaches. 
Table 2: Comparison of scale  
of cooperation  
Note: ADB’s Art. 6 Support Facility 
has not yet specified its scope.
Table 3: Comparison of 
cooperative routes under  
Article 6
Programmatic/ 
Project scale
Sectoral scale Policy scale
AfDB: ABM
Japan: JCM
Switzerland: KliK
Switzerland: Climate 
Cent
Sweden: SEA Virtual 
Pilots
World Bank: SCF
World Bank: 
Warehouse
Canada-Chile
NEFCO: Peruvian 
waste sector
Sweden: SEA Virtual 
Pilots
World Bank: 
Warehouse
Japan; JCM
World Bank: TCAF
World Bank: 
Warehouse
Instrument neutral Article 6.2 Article 6.8
Canada-Chile
NEFCO: Peruvian Pilot
Sweden: SEA Pilots*
World Bank: SCF
Japan: JCM
Switzerland: CCF
Switzerland: KliK
World Bank: TCAF
Sweden: SEA Pilots*
ABM
* Certain SEA Virtual Pilots are framed as instrument neutral, while others may use Article 6.2 from 
the start. Information on all SEA Virtual Pilots is not yet available.
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3. OBSERVATIONS FROM PILOTING 
Parties are significantly changing the modalities in which international coop-
eration takes place with the new approaches under Article 6. In this section 
we look at the early lessons that can be drawn from existing pilot activities 
under Article 6 and how these pilots are dealing with the overarching changes 
and open questions that still need to be addressed by negotiators. The cur-
rent direction of the Article 6 negotiations points to the following key poten-
tial changes:
•  In order to avoid double counting of mitigation outcomes, participat-
ing countries have to make a corresponding adjustment for any ITMOs 
transferred.
•  Corresponding amounts of ITMOs have to be reported in each country’s 
biennial transparency report and be included in its NDC accounting. 
•  It is the Parties’ prerogative to define the type of cooperation they want 
to enter into - no type of cooperation is prima facie excluded: be it activi-
ty-based or more broadly defined, using tons of CO²e or a different metric 
(subject to final Article 6 rules). 
•  Compared to the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible instruments, countries have 
a more pronounced role in managing, implementing and assessing the 
cooperation - this is true in particular for Article 6.2, but also applies to 
Article 6.4.
•  The prospective rules on baselines and additionality under Article 6.4 are 
likely to have a greater sector orientation and recognize best available or 
performance benchmarks - they also need to consider the policies and 
measures put in place by the host country to achieve its NDC.
•  Under Article 6.4 (and possibly 6.2 as well), activities are to contribute to an 
overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE).
•  The contribution of Article 6 activities to sustainable development goals 
has gained significance.
In light of these differences, this section focuses on how pilots are already 
addressing (or not) the new challenges of Article 6 cooperation, and high-
lights emerging trends.
A.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN 
ARTICLE 6 TRANSACTIONS?
A new challenge for transactions under Article 6 is the enhanced role expected 
from host country governments in the transactions themselves. Due to 
the host country’s own NDC mitigation contribution, emission reductions 
become a national asset under the PA. Even though rules are not finalized, 
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it is foreseeable that host governments will have a large role to play in over-
seeing and authorizing the export of mitigation outcomes to other countries. 
This enhanced role will likely also impact the domestic process of issuing let-
ters of authorization to the use of ITMOs pursuant to Article 6.2, as well as to 
activities implemented under Article 6.4, thus requiring greater capacity from 
national institutions and designated authorities. 
This is comparable to the situation under JI where governments had to issue 
emission reduction units (ERUs)5 but it is new in relation to the CDM. While 
under the CDM, project developers could (in most cases) claim the right to 
the credits as investors in a mitigation activity without substantial govern-
ment participation, the fact that virtually all countries now have their own 
GHG targets under the PA, changes the situation considerably. In granting 
the authorization for project developers to participate in mitigation activities 
and sell mitigation outcomes internationally, host country governments will 
have to exert caution to not sign off on any transfers of emission reductions 
that the country will need, to comply with its NDC. This means having a very 
good understanding of the mitigation efforts needed for fulfilling the NDC, 
the costs of achieving those, and how this translates into specific mitigation 
interventions in order to avoid jeopardizing domestic mitigation targets due 
to over-selling ITMOs internationally. Additionally, governments will have a 
hands-on responsibility to track and record ITMOs, as well as to adjust their 
biennial transparency reporting6  for any exported mitigation outcomes.
Emerging pilots are reflecting this more active role of governments and the 
relevance of NDCs in their transactions. This is true for the host countries 
involved, but also applies to buyers. The current pilots are all being devel-
oped through public agencies (e.g. SEA, NEFCO), undertaken in close collab-
oration with governments (e.g. JCM, Swiss pilots), or funded through multi-
lateral initiatives (e.g. TCAF, SCF). For some pilots, host and buying country 
governments directly engage with each other (e.g. JCM, NEFCO-Peru Concep-
tual Pilot, Swiss pilots). 
As governments are increasing their involvement in transactions, the contrac-
tual structures are diversifying. While under the CDM, contracts were con-
cluded between (mostly private) buyers and sellers of carbon assets, comple-
mented by a letter of approval (LoA) from governments involved, the Article 
6 pilots indicate a potentially more diverse future contracting landscape. The 
emerging mitigation outcome purchase agreements (“MOPAs”) seek to clarify 
the roles for governments and private entities in meeting and exceeding NDC 
targets, as well the sharing of the risk of the host country not achieving the 
NDC. 
Some Article 6 pilots such as the JCM or the SCF are based on bottom-up 
contracts with project developers. Others, like TCAF or NEFCO’s initiative may 
enter into a MOPA directly with the host country government. This mirrors 
the situation that rights to emission reductions could belong to either the 
investor in a mitigation activity or the government (depending on the type of 
intervention and local laws and principles around property rights). If a MOPA 
5 Some governments only issued less ERUs 
than emissions reductions achieved by the JI 
projects. France had a discount of 10%, while 
New Zealand asked JI project developers to 
bid for a discount. 
6 Biennial transparency reports refer to main 
reporting obligation to Parties pursuant to 
Article 13.13 of the PA. Biennial transparency 
reporting will include, among others, the 
national GHG inventory and the information 
necessary to track progress in implementing 
and achieving NDCs. 
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is entered into with a project developer, this entity has to seek government 
authorization. In the future, a government could also proactively allocate the 
rights to the emission reductions to private sector investors for certain sec-
tors or mitigation opportunities, but this is not yet observed in the current 
pilots. In turn, if the MOPA is entered into with the host country, the contract-
ing Parties (countries) can either enact certain policies to ensure the mitiga-
tion outcome is achieved, or devise ways of passing on the incentive to those 
that are investing in mitigation activities. 
A hybrid approach observed in the pilots is where countries enter into a 
framework agreement to secure the necessary GHG accounting adjustments, 
but leave certain transactional aspects to other entities. The Swiss pilots are 
an example where parallel contracting structures can be observed: the Swiss 
ministry of environment (FOEN) enters into a government-to-government 
agreement with the host country through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) that defines the overall framework for the cooperation, while KliK as the 
private sector buyer of the carbon negotiates, enters a purchase agreement 
with a project developer. The emergence of such parallel contractual struc-
tures seems a natural consequence of the shared responsibilities between 
governments and non-government entities. While this contractual structure 
will foster a deeper exchange between governments and predictability for 
preventing double counting, it can also be time and resource consuming.
Interestingly, the emerging pilots do not – at least at this stage – replicate the 
JI model with respect to the manner in which they interact with host coun-
tries. Under JI, project developers and the respective host countries defined 
domestically (and largely without the participation of foreign buyers) the pro-
cess of undertaking accounting adjustments through letters of authorization 
and cancellation of AAUs. In the case of a number of emerging Article 6 pilots, 
it will likely be international agreements reached between the seller and the 
buying country that will further specify how accounting adjustments will be 
made for that particular pilot, thus with much greater interaction from the 
buying side.
B.  HOW ARE THE PILOTS DEFINING THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDCs?
How the Article 6 pilot transaction relates to the NDC commitments of the 
host country is a relevant consideration for all pilots, even though not all 
pilots have resolved the issue. Even before the international rules are fully 
defined, pilots generally seek to make sure double counting of mitigation out-
comes is avoided between the host and the acquiring country. Many pilot 
developers also wish to ensure that the cooperation goes beyond the cur-
rent ambition of the host country’s NDC. Several approaches for dealing with 
NDCs can be observed from the pilots:
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BUILDING UP HOST COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS
The first approach towards dealing with the integration of an Article 6 trans-
action into the host country’s climate change strategy is by setting up domes-
tic and/or bilateral committees that assess the NDC relationship, based on 
their knowledge of the sector and the country’s overall climate strategy. 
This is an important component, for instance, of the SCF in Senegal and 
Rwanda. The SCF creates a technical advisory committee and a governing 
board that presides over the methodologies for the generation of credits 
and ultimately the transfer of ITMOs. Another example of an institutional 
approach can be found in the JCM. The JCM sets up Joint Committees made 
up of representatives from the government of Japan and the host country, 
which evaluate the technological needs of the country, decides on the use 
of methodologies and determines the sharing of the mitigation outcome 
between Japan and the host country. 
Similarly, in Peru, a dedicated Multisectoral Commission, composed of 13 
ministries, was established to assess the mitigation potential of the various 
sectors and identify different mitigation options to achieve the country’s 
NDC. This Multisectoral Commission also considered the international sup-
port required to implement the different mitigation activities. 
Additionally, national institutions and designated authorities authorising the 
use of ITMOs and/or the implementation of Article 6.4 activities will likely need 
to exercise a broader set of technical and administrative functions that can 
reflect the considerations and guidelines agreed by these inter-ministerial 
and bilateral committees. This ensures that these guidelines are well over-
seen and implemented, securing that mitigation interventions are aligned 
with the host country NDC and that mitigation outcomes are comprised of 
real, additional and properly estimated emission reductions. 
GOING BEYOND THE CONDITIONAL AND/OR UNCONDITIONAL 
TARGETS
Many developing countries differentiate between the parts of their NDC that 
are conditional upon receiving financial or technical support, and those that 
they will achieve unconditionally through domestic means. While that is com-
mon practice in the formulation of NDCs, no such differentiation exists in the 
Paris Rulebook. Likewise, Article 6 does not make a distinction between con-
ditional or unconditional targets. It is therefore up to the participating coun-
tries to define the relationship of an Article 6 transaction to the conditional or 
unconditional NDCs of the host country. Some pilot implementers find that 
the transaction should lead to an increase of ambition beyond the uncondi-
tional and conditional targets. Others, like the SCF, find it sufficient that the 
cooperation would reduce emissions beyond the unconditional pledge of the 
host country. 
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LINKING TRANSFERS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NDC GOALS 
Some pilots are also devising contractual structures to address risks asso-
ciated with non-fulfilment of NDC commitments. While Article 6 pilots are 
already being considered, NDC commitments have to be fulfilled long in 
the future: many countries have put forward single year targets relating to 
the country’s overall emissions in the year 2030. This means that the risk 
of non-compliance with NDC targets has to be carefully assessed and man-
aged early on. Some Article 6 pilots such as the NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot 
and the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot have suggested a conditional sale of ITMOs, 
where the international transfer would be tied to the fulfilment of certain 
‘conditions precedent’ linked to the positive GHG performance of the relevant 
sector. Until these conditions are met (with funding support from the buyer), 
the buyer could not effectively claim title to the emission reductions. On the 
other hand, the buyer would retain the right to purchase a certain amount of 
ITMOs at a pre-defined price in the future.
SHARING THE MITIGATION OUTCOME
In many of the pilots, a sharing of the mitigation outcome between the buyer 
and the host country is envisaged. This ensures that host countries also 
increase their climate change ambition through the cooperation. TCAF, for 
example, seeks to purchase a portion of the mitigation outcomes from the 
underlying programs and policies, while the remaining part will be allocated 
to the host country. Contributors to the TCAF may use these assets for their 
own compliance, to contribute towards their climate finance objectives (i.e. 
through cancellation) or allow the host country to use them towards their 
NDC targets.
Another example is the JCM whereby the governments from Japan and host 
countries decide through the Joint Committees about the amount of credits 
to be allocated to Japan and to the host Party. In this phase, credits are not 
tradable, but options to allow international transfers could be explored at a 
later stage. 
In the NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot, one of the suggestions presented is 
that the cooperating countries allocate and share mitigation outcomes on 
the basis of the technological components applied in the solid waste sector 
NAMA (for instance, with emissions reductions stemming from the imple-
mentation of sanitary landfills with methane recovery and flaring attributed 
to Peru, whereas those emission reductions derived from the use of biogas to 
produce energy could be attributed to the buying country).
A slightly different approach for ensuring host country ambition is taken by 
the Swiss for whom a criterion is that partner countries must have an NDC 
that is mainly achieved through domestic means.
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C.  ARE THE PILOTS BUILDING UP CAPACITY 
FOR TRACKING AND ACCOUNTING FOR 
ITMOs?
While for CDM projects tracking emission reductions at project level was suf-
ficient, activities under Article 6 will also require national level tracking if mit-
igation outcomes are to be transferred abroad. The tracking and reporting of 
ITMOs is the basis for corresponding adjustments, which participating coun-
tries in an Article 6 transaction have to make to their emissions balance. This 
is the case for cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 and by extension 
may also apply to units generated under the Article 6.4 mechanism if they 
are transferred internationally, although this is one of the remaining crunch 
issues in the negotiations. 
Even as the Article 6 rules are still pending, the basic requirements on report-
ing on ITMOs and performing corresponding adjustments have already been 
agreed upon in the Paris Rulebook through the enhanced transparency 
framework (see box 1). These can be seen as the guardrails while the detailed 
Box 1: Corresponding adjustments in the Paris Rulebook 
(d) Each Party that participates in cooperative approaches that involve 
the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards an 
NDC under Article 4, or authorizes the use of mitigation outcomes for 
international mitigation purposes other than achievement of its NDC 
shall also provide the following information in the structured summary 
consistent with relevant decisions adopted by the CMA on Article 6 and 
-/CMA.1: 
 (i)   the annual level of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks covered by the NDC on an annual basis 
reported biennially; 
 (ii)   an emissions balance reflecting the level of anthropogenic emis-
sions by sources and removals by sinks covered by their NDC 
adjusted on the basis of corresponding adjustments undertaken 
by effecting an addition for internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes first-transferred/transferred and a subtraction 
for ITMOs used/acquired, consistent with decisions adopted by 
the CMA on Article 6; 
 (iii)  any other information consistent with decisions adopted by the 
CMA on reporting under Article 6; 
 (iv)  information on how each cooperative approach promotes 
sustainable development; and ensures environmental integrity 
and transparency, including in governance; and applies robust 
accounting to ensure inter alia the avoidance of double count-
ing, consistent with decisions adopted by the CMA on Article 6
Source: UNFCCC (2018): Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the trans-
parency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the 
Paris Agreement, Paragraph 77 (d)
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methodological approaches still have to be worked out through the Article 
6.2 guidance (see further down below).
A relevant question for the piloting phase is how far the current pilot initia-
tives are contributing to building a national-level tracking infrastructure (i.e., 
improving MRV capacity) and paving the way towards corresponding adjust-
ments of ITMOs (i.e., ensuring proper accounting of mitigation outcomes). 
As an early observation, pilots are generally concerned with fostering new 
systems and building MRV capacities at national level and do so through dif-
ferent approaches. Some pilots are also beginning to consider the methods 
they will use to effect ITMO accounting adjustments, making sure these actu-
ally ‘correspond’ between seller and buyer. 
REGISTRIES
Registries lie at the heart of the infrastructure needed for tracking ITMOs, 
as these are the systems in which mitigation outcomes created, transferred 
and used are recorded. The requirements and design specifications for regis-
tries are relatively uncontested in the Article 6 negotiations. According to the 
Katowice President’s textual proposal on Article 6.2, each Party shall have a 
domestic registry or access to a registry for tracking ITMO information, and 
the UNFCCC secretariat shall implement an international registry for partici-
pating Parties without access to a domestic registry. Each registry shall have 
accounts and be able to track information on transfers, uses, cancellations 
and holdings of ITMOs, among others. 
The most advanced among the pilots in developing a registry infrastructure 
is the JCM. To support transfers under the JCM, the Japanese government has 
set up a dedicated registry, which has already been in operation since 2015. 
Account holders can access both general information and their own 
accounts while general users can only access general information.
Figure 3: The JCM registry
Source: Government of Japan, Recent 
Developments of the JCM, July 2018
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The registry serves both Japan as well as its partner countries if they so wish, 
however, partner countries can also build their own registries based on com-
mon design specifications with the Japanese registry. The system allows for 
the issuance of JCM credits into private accounts and supports the issuance, 
retirement, holding and cancellation of JCM credits. It also provides access to 
information to the general public.  
Other pilots are also considering the support of national registries. For 
instance, in the case of REDD+, the FCPF considers both the possibility of 
using a centralized FCPF registry or, alternatively, the creation of national reg-
istries in REDD+ countries that can have the emission reductions issued and 
transacted in a transparent and secure manner.   
Similarly, the World Bank, through the SCF pilots in Senegal and Rwanda, has 
already identified the need for a domestic infrastructure as an area for fur-
ther development.
MRV SYSTEMS, TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPACITIES
Another approach towards strengthening countries’ capacities to track miti-
gation outcomes nationally lies in building MRV capacity outside of the Paris 
Rulebook. Various pilots incorporate elements to strengthen information sys-
tems or national protocols for monitoring sectoral emissions and emission 
reductions.
The NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot, for example, builds heavily on previous 
analysis and systems created to improve solid waste management in the 
country, including several updated versions of the SIGERSOL platform. The 
SIGERSOL functions as an on-line MRV tool that consolidates in a single elec-
tronic database all relevant waste-related information provided by districts 
and provinces in Peru. This strengthens the government’s capacity to mea-
sure the results of its Solid Waste Sector NAMA, while at the same time feed-
ing information into the national greenhouse gas inventory.
Another example is the Canada-Chile Environment Cooperation. On the basis 
of experiences gained with the CDM, these countries are working together to 
enhance and strengthen MRV capacities for tracking, monitoring, and report-
ing emission reductions through the development of new tools, including the 
development of three new GHG verification protocols: landfill gas, anaerobic 
digestion and diversion of organics. The focus is to contribute to developing 
GHG plans and reporting templates for the various projects, as well as to 
support innovative MRV solutions including smart metering and digital tech-
nologies such as blockchain. 
CORRESPONDING ADJUSTMENTS
In addition to MRV systems, pilots need to consider the accounting implica-
tions of the international transfer of ITMOs. Corresponding adjustments can-
not actually be implemented yet, as the Article 6.2 guidance is still pending 
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and national reporting under the PA will only commence at a later date (Par-
ties shall submit their first biennial transparency report and national inven-
tory report, if submitted as a stand-alone report, at the latest by 31 Decem-
ber 2024). However, some pilots are already exploring different options for 
performing corresponding adjustments as part of their technical discussions 
with the involved stakeholders. Among the most progressed pilots in this 
regard are TCAF and the Swiss pilots, which are looking at methodological 
options for applying corresponding adjustments. 
Box 2:  Methods for corresponding adjustments for multi-year and 
single-year NDCs 
12.  Each participating Party that has a multi-year NDC shall apply one 
of the following methods consistently throughout its period for NDC 
implementation:
  (a) calculating a multi-year emissions trajectory for the period for 
NDC implementation which is consistent with the NDC and 
applying a corresponding adjustment for each year covered by 
this emissions trajectory;
  (b) applying a corresponding adjustment for each year in the period 
for NDC implementation;
  (c)  applying a corresponding adjustment at the end of the NDC 
period for the total amount of ITMOs first transferred and 
used, or transferred and acquired over the period of the NDC 
implementation.
13.  Each participating Party that has a single year NDC shall apply, in 
order to make the corresponding adjustments in the NDC year con-
sistent and representative of NDC implementation and achievement, 
one of the following methods consistently throughout the period for 
NDC implementation: 
  (a) The method referred to in paragraph 12(a) above; 
  (b) The method referred to in paragraph 12(b) above; 
  (c)  The method referred to in paragraph 12(c) above, where both 
participating Parties apply this method for the cooperative 
approach; 
  (d) Calculating the average annual amount of ITMOs first trans-
ferred and used, or transferred and acquired over the period of 
the NDC implementation and applying a corresponding adjust-
ment equal to this average amount for the NDC year. 
  (e) The Party may only first transfer or transfer consistent with sec-
tion V (Corresponding adjustments), ITMOs that are of the same 
vintage as the Party’s single year NDC and/or only acquire or 
use ITMOs that are of the same vintage as the Party’s single-year 
NDC. 
Source: The Katowice Texts – Proposal by the President, Section III on Article 
6.2, Paragraphs 12 and 13
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The difficulty lies, for one, in the nature of the NDCs given that many coun-
tries have opted for single year targets. This raises the question whether cor-
responding adjustments should occur only in the target year or throughout 
an assumed NDC trajectory. Another complication is the fact that the selling 
and the acquiring country cannot necessarily choose their approach inde-
pendently from each other and irrespective of what the other side does, as 
adjustments need to correspond. If, for example, the seller makes a corre-
sponding adjustment only for the ITMOs generated and transferred in the 
target year, while the buyer uses the cumulative amount of ITMOs acquired 
throughout the entire NDC period and subtracts the full amount in the target 
year, collective emissions are not adequately reported and accounted for. 
An early indication from the Article 6.2 President’s text is that the choice of 
the approach may be left to the discretion of the participating Parties, as long 
as they each use one approach consistently. For single year targets, the use 
of cumulative amounts may, however, only be allowed if both Parties in the 
transfer use the same approach (see textbox 2).
D.  HOW ARE BASELINES AND ADDITIONALITY 
DETERMINED?
How to define baselines and additionality in the context of the PA is another 
hotly debated topic. While under the CDM a rich body of methodologies and 
tools for determining baselines and calculating emission reductions has been 
developed, three issues in particular are preventing Parties from simply tran-
sitioning existing approaches to Article 6. 
First, the view of many Parties is that the NDCs and long-term targets of Par-
ties along with the policies and measures put in place to achieve them, have 
to be considered when formulating the baseline to ensure that only efforts 
that go beyond the current level of ambition are credited. The point is not 
that straightforward because the alternative view also exists, that coopera-
tion should enable countries to achieve their (already ambitious and some-
times conditional) goals formulated in the NDCs.
Second, a long-term desire by many Parties to reform the methodologies 
used under the CDM – be it for reasons of environmental integrity or simplify-
ing their use – and third, the desire to enable broader (policy or sector-wide) 
approaches under Article 6 for which the existing methodologies may not be 
suitable.
Driven by these considerations, the emerging rules under Article 6 are seek-
ing to redefine baselines and additionality. When it comes to Article 6.2 coop-
erative approaches, Parties are taking a rather hands-off approach, so far 
leaving the operationalization of baseline and additionality concepts to the 
participating Parties. The Article 6.2 draft texts from SBSTA and the Polish 
presidency simply define a number of principles through which environmen-
tal integrity should be ensured, inter alia through stringent reference levels, 
baselines set in a conservative way and below business-as-usual emission 
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projections (including by taking into account all existing policies and address-
ing potential leakage) and by ensuring the compensation of any material 
reversals.
For the Article 6.4 mechanism, Parties have started to define more spe-
cific guidance for determining the baseline that is clustered around four 
approaches: A performance based / best available approach, historic emis-
sions, business-as-usual emissions and standardized baselines (see textbox 
3). 
Box 3: Baseline and additionality approaches under Article 6.4 
35.  Each [mechanism methodology] [activity] shall apply one of the 
following approaches to setting a baseline for calculating emission 
reductions, taking into account relevant national, regional or local 
circumstances, and providing justification for the choice: 
   (a) A [best available] [performance-based] approach, taking into 
account:
    (i) Technologies that represent an economically feasible and 
environmentally attractive course of action; 
    (ii) The emissions of activities providing similar outputs and/or 
services in similar social, economic, environmental and techno-
logical circumstances; 
   (iii) Barriers to investment; 
    (iv) A contribution to the reduction of the emission levels of the 
host Party; 
   (b) Where the approach referred to in paragraph 35(a) above is not 
considered to be appropriate, an approach based on:
   (i) Business-as-usual emissions; 
   (ii) Historic emissions. 
36.  Standardized baselines may be developed by the Supervisory Body 
at the request of the host Party, or may be developed by the host 
Party and approved by the Supervisory Body. Standardized baselines 
shall be established at the highest possible level of aggregation in 
the relevant sector of the host Party. 
37.  Each mechanism methodology shall specify the approach to demon-
strating the additionality of the activity. The activity is additional 
where: 
   (a) Emission reductions achieved by the activity are additional to 
any that would otherwise occur, taking into account all relevant 
national policies, including legislation; 
   (b) Emission reductions are complementary to the policies and 
measures implemented to achieve the NDC of the host Party. 
Source: The Katowice Texts – Proposal by the President, Section III on Article 
6.4, Paragraphs 35-37
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7 Shrestha, J. Public Input on JCM_PW_
PM001-Displacement of Grid and Captive 
GensetElectricity by a Small-scale Solar PV 
System, Ver 01.0, 2015, 
It is worth noting that baseline approaches that take into account future 
emissions increases, due to economic development (also called suppressed 
demand), are absent from these options, even though they have been par-
ticularly important to develop CDM methodologies that incentivize greenfield 
investments in low-income countries with low historical emissions. 
This begs the question in how far the pilots are considering baseline and 
additionality approaches that differ from existing CDM methodologies and 
how they are responding to the new challenges of the NDC context. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CDM METHODOLOGIES
What can be observed so far, is that several pilot initiatives are building on 
the CDM as they make use of CDM methodologies and project cycle as a start-
ing point. The SCF, for example, functions in parallel to the CDM project cycle, 
and utilizes the data available from this process. The SCF simplifies the appli-
cation of the methodology through pre-approved default parameters for the 
national context and the definition of automatically additional technologies. 
The SCF also simplifies the project cycle itself, inter alia through validation of 
the methodology at the sector level and the use of check-box templates for 
individual activities. 
The NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot and a number of the SEA Virtual Pilots also 
build on CDM methodologies and programmatic approaches in their relevant 
sectors (e.g., waste and decentralized energy generation). The SEA-Nigeria 
Virtual Pilot also suggests adjusting and employing the SCF concept, to the 
extent possible, in order to streamline the activity verification and approval 
cycle at domestic level. 
A final example of a pilot with CDM methodologies as starting point is the 
JCM. Similar to the SCF it modifies existing methodologies in order to sim-
plify their use. To do so, the JCM uses conservative default factors, sim-
plified monitoring approaches based on agreed spreadsheet formats and 
crediting thresholds that are deemed more ambitious than BAU. Method-
ologies have to be approved separately for each host country, which adds 
to transaction costs. Through the use of conservative baselines, the JCM 
simultaneously seeks to contribute to an overall mitigation of global emis-
sions. In the past, there have been discussions regarding the conservative-
ness of the baselines.7
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDCs
Pilots starting with CDM methodologies tend to address the NDC context indi-
rectly by factoring existing national laws and climate policies that the country 
has put in place to meet its NDC target into the determination of the baseline 
and additionality. There also is the possibility of starting with NDC targets 
more directly and looking at the developments of emissions at the sector 
level. Some pilots are also adopting this top-down approach.
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The NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot, for example, suggests the use of a sector 
crediting baseline that mirrors both the unconditional and conditional pledge 
of Peru’s NDC transfer and using a GHG emissions trajectory that would func-
tion as an accounting benchmark for the buyer and seller. This annual tra-
jectory of emissions to achieve the host country NDC would be established 
at cooperative level only (e.g., in the MOPA entered into between the host 
country and the buyer), circumventing the political difficulties associated with 
the host country converting its single NDC into a multi-year NDC. Emission 
reductions that lead to ITMOs would be measured, reported and verified 
independently, and would only be ‘converted’ into ITMOs if they exceed the 
pre-defined sector crediting baseline.
The prime example for the use of sectoral baselines is TCAF, which develops 
carbon accounting methodologies for policies and economy- or sector-wide 
programs that go beyond project-based activities. In TCAF’s case, baselines 
are derived from host countries’ unconditional NDC targets. Single-year tar-
gets are by default linearized over the NDC period and the resulting trajectory 
is compared to emission trajectories under the BAU scenario, derived from 
modelling. The more conservative of the two is then used as the crediting 
baseline. Crediting will be applied to the difference between the crediting 
baseline and the factual performance of the supported program. However, 
specific TCAF baseline methodologies have yet to be published, and only the 
general principles8 have been made available. Hence, their degree of con-
servativeness and ability to exclude non-additional activities cannot be inde-
pendently assessed. Baselines will be validated by independent experts and 
the verification of emission reductions will be performed by a third party. 
The FCPF, with regards to REDD+, seeks to ensure that program proponents 
produce conservative and robust baselines based on a ten-year historical 
average. These reference levels are expected to link to national baselines by 
either informing, or being informed by, national reference levels developed 
by REDD+ countries under the UNFCCC. However, for most REDD+ countries, 
it remains to be seen how these national reference levels will be integrated 
into the broader land-use sector accounting and into the country’s NDC.
E.  WHAT ROLE DOES SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT PLAY?
The Paris Agreement calls for an integrated approach with Agenda 2030 for 
sustainable development. Even though many stakeholders and Parties called 
for a more prominent role of sustainable development in Article 6 compared 
to the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible instruments, the issue is hardly taken up dif-
ferently in the texts coming out of Katowice. Earlier references about Article 
6 activities having to conform to the implementation of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) have been dropped in both the SBSTA and the 
Katowice President’s text and the reference to host Party’s obligation on 
human rights appears bracketed in the final text. Similar to the CDM, the 
remaining obligation in the Katowice texts refers to the host Party confirm-
ing that the activity fosters sustainable development based on its national 
8 World Bank. Core parameters for TCAF 
operations. July 2018
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prerogative. This is similarly required for activities under Article 6.2 and Arti-
cle 6.4. However, a related addition that has survived the negotiations until 
now, is that activities shall avoid negative environmental impacts or address 
any conflicts with environment-related aspects. 
In the current pilots, by contrast, sustainable development tends to feature 
high on the agenda. The Swiss engagement in carbon markets has been tra-
ditionally focused on sustainable development co-benefits of mitigation proj-
ects, both in the Article 6 negotiations, where Switzerland is part of the Envi-
ronmental Integrity Group (EIG), and in the purchasing policies of the Swiss 
Climate Cent Foundation (CCF) and the KliK Foundation. The Swiss pilots are 
selected based on an evaluation of the activity’s contribution to sustainable 
development, including the SDGs, environmental and social safeguards being 
applied, and stakeholder rights being firmly respected. Furthermore, nuclear 
energy or activities that result in a technological lock-in of fossil fuel energies 
are excluded. 
Other pilots also spell out the additional environmental benefits of the activ-
ity or make clear references to the SDGs targeted. The NEFCO-Peru Concep-
tual Pilot, for example, lists a number of sustainable development benefits 
from improved waste management systems, such as the reduction of local 
pollution, diseases and prevention of water and soil contamination. The Vir-
tual Pilot in Nigeria contributes directly to SDG 7, which comprises universal 
access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services by 2030 as well 
as increasing the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. It also 
aims to meet SDG 13, by integrating climate change measures into national 
policies, strategies and planning. 
Activities that are targeted by the SCF Pilots are part of the portfolio of the 
Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev), a World Bank trust fund that, as 
part of its mandate, targets clean energy technologies in low income coun-
tries and seeks to enhance energy access in rural communities. For TCAF, like 
other World Bank operated funds, the Trustee is to ensure the compliance of 
all programs with the environmental and social safeguard standards of the 
World Bank and their consistency with SDGs. In addition, TCAF aims to create 
larger drive and momentum for sustainable development through mobilizing 
climate finance and supporting socio-economic growth.
Quite a different approach is taken by the JCM. Rather than focusing on 
sustainable development, a concept that cannot objectively be defined, the 
mechanism is technology oriented and supports all types of low-carbon tech-
nologies, including potentially nuclear energy or efficiency improvements in 
the use of fossil fuels. Many JCM projects involve energy efficiency measures 
in industrial applications. The JCM therefore rejects any up-front exclusion of 
technologies on the basis of sustainable development. Notwithstanding, the 
JCM has recently started to develop guidelines for the monitoring and report-
ing of sustainable development aspects.
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F.   HOW HAS OVERALL MITIGATION BEEN 
INCORPORATED?
For the Article 6.4 mechanism, the contribution of an activity to OMGE is men-
tioned as a requirement at the level of the PA text. No such requirement 
applies to cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 at the level of the PA, 
however the texts from Katowice nevertheless encourage participating par-
ties to deliver an overall mitigation through a voluntary cancellation or setting 
aside of ITMOs that are not used for any transfer or purpose, including use by 
any Party towards its NDC. 
The negotiations see Parties disagreeing on the way overall mitigation should 
be operationalized. Views range from the application of conservative base-
lines over a shared mitigation benefit with the host country, to the manda-
tory cancellation of units. Some Parties also think that overall mitigation is 
automatically achieved by the activities, for example through a continuation 
of an activity after its crediting period comes to an end. In Katowice, this has 
resulted in an open list of possibilities through which activities can demon-
strate a contribution to overall mitigation (see box 4). 
Box 4: Delivering overall mitigation in global emissions under Article 6.4 
60. The mechanism shall aim to deliver an overall mitigation in global 
emissions through any one or a combination of the following: 
  (a) A voluntary cancellation method by which, following certification 
and verification of emission reductions, the host Party makes a cor-
responding adjustment consistent with the guidance for cooperative 
approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2 for the full amount 
of issued A6.4ERs to be first transferred, and the registry transfers 10 
per cent of the total amount of A6.4ERs to a cancellation account for 
overall mitigation in accordance with section V.I above ([Forwarding]
[transfer] from the mechanism registry); and the cancelled A6.4ERs 
may not be used for any transfer or purpose, including by any Party 
towards its NDC or for voluntary cancellation. 
  (a) Providing a source of mitigation outcomes that enable Parties to 
select higher ambition in its NDC; 
  (b) Voluntary cancellation of A6.4ERs by Parties and stakeholders, 
including non-State actors; 
  (c) Voluntary measures selected by participating Parties; 
  (d) Applying conservative baselines, or baselines that are below busi-
ness-as-usual, to the calculation of emission reductions for Article 6, 
paragraph 4 activities; 
  (e) Applying conservative default emission factors to the calculation of 
emissions from Article 6, paragraph 4 activities. 
Source: The Katowice Texts – Proposal by the President, Section III on Article 
6.4, Paragraph 60
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What can be observed in the pilots is a focus on two approaches: the sharing 
of mitigation outcomes between the buyer and the host country and the use 
of conservative baselines. 
Many pilots consider the sharing of mitigation outcomes with the host coun-
try. Often times this is linked to the provision of results-based finance made 
available for the host country to achieve a mitigation objective but without 
the need of receiving emission reductions in return, such as with the World 
Bank’s TCAF.
The JCM is an example that explicitly employs the use of conservative base-
lines in order to deal with the requirement of overall mitigation (or net emis-
sion reductions as it is termed under the JCM). All the while, the JCM has been 
developed as a cooperative approach under Article 6.2 for which an overall 
mitigation is yet to be required. 
FURTHER READING
Nordic Initiative for Cooperative Approaches, Article 6 Landscapes, February 2019.
ADB, Decoding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, April 2018.
UNFCCC, Proposal by the President, December 2018.
UNFCCC, Informal compilation of documents, December 15, 2018.
ERCST, Katowice COP24: Outcomes on Article 6, December 2018.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
There is a broad array of Article 6 pilot initiatives under way, ranging from 
virtual pilots to actual (future) transactions of ITMOs, that are being launched 
both by countries and multilateral development banks. Currently, we are at 
an early stage of piloting and therefore lessons remain limited. This is exac-
erbated by the limited transparency of various initiatives. For example, the 
World Bank’s initiatives TCAF and ITMO Warehouse provide only little docu-
mentation on their methodological approaches. This contrasts heavily with 
the World Bank’s approach for piloting the Kyoto mechanisms in the early 
2000s when the Prototype Carbon Fund was exemplary regarding its docu-
mentation, including an annual report and activity pipeline. An initiative with 
a great amount of transparency, on the other hand, is the JCM, which pub-
lishes detailed information on its procedures, projects and formulas for cal-
culating emission reductions.
The limited availability of public information on many of the pilot activities 
may be due to different reasons. Some pilot developers are certainly cautious 
not to disclose information considered confidential, as negotiations with part-
nering countries are still ongoing. Others may be reluctant to expose their ini-
tiatives before the Article 6 negotiations are concluded on the political level. 
Yet, others may still be at the early stages of development. Given the avail-
able information, our study focuses on high level observations and emerging 
trends that can be gathered from the pilots while identifying a number of 
critical issues for further reflection.    
Key aspects of pilots include how they define government responsibilities, 
the connection of transactions with the NDCs, the accounting and tracking 
of ITMOs, baseline methodologies and additionality tests, the safeguards for 
a contribution to sustainable development, as well as how an overall contri-
bution to global mitigation can be ensured. While all initiatives verbally sup-
port the aim to prevent double counting, promote sustainable development 
and ensure additionality, their approaches to address these aspects and their 
performance related to these aims, remain unclear. 
We see that diversified contractual and incentive structures for ITMO trans-
fer agreements are emerging in the pilots, with most aiming for an Article 
6.2 transaction. The Swiss CCF and KliK pilots define a suite of contractual 
documents, starting with a letter of intent followed by a bilateral MoU on a 
government to government level that then triggers a Mitigation Outcomes 
Purchase Agreement (“MOPA”) with mitigation activity developers. The NEF-
CO-Peru Conceptual Pilot proposes an innovative call option for ITMO sales, 
whose workings have yet to be proven. The call option would have a pre-
mium that would be paid ex ante according to pre-defined milestones. Such 
an approach would have an in-built incentive to set up a functional Article 6 
infrastructure on the side of the host country. The SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot 
builds on a green bond that functions with a reduced interest rate through 
in kind pay-outs in form of ITMOs. The JCM and SCF envisage contracts with 
mitigation activity developers. The SCF has developed a simplified activity 
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cycle with validation linked to ex post verification, leading to significant time 
savings compared to the CDM. Moreover, both the JCM and the SCF invest in 
bilateral institution building. 
The sharing of ITMOs is already undertaken under the JCM, while in other 
pilots, generic approaches are still being discussed. Sharing could at times 
be achieved indirectly, e.g. through conservative baselines or short crediting 
periods. 
The JCM offers a central registry, yet leaves the option for host countries to 
also set up their own registry. Many pilots, including the Canada-Chile Envi-
ronment Cooperation and the NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot, try to build MRV 
infrastructures. However, it remains unclear whether these infrastructures 
will be sustained after the pilot phase comes to an end. 
While a number of initiatives use CDM baseline and monitoring methodolo-
gies, others, such as the JCM, SCF and TCAF, state they aim to simplify base-
line and monitoring methodologies compared to the Kyoto mechanisms. Yet, 
only a few of them, including the JCM, have actually developed specific meth-
odologies to advance this goal. In the JCM context, emission factors seem to 
be conservative but often additionality is assumed for any activity beating a 
specific emissions benchmark, which could lead to crediting of economically 
attractive activities. Similarly, the SCF applies positive lists for additionality 
determination which could be problematic for technologies with rapid cost 
decreases. At the same time, the move towards sector specific, nationally 
(co-)determined positive lists of technologies pursued by both pilots relieves 
project developers of cumbersome project-by-project additionality tests com-
mon under the CDM and fits the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement, in 
which countries define their contributions based on national contexts. A pre-
dictable process to revise positive lists when the economic attractiveness of 
technologies changes over time, would enable to keep credibility high while 
transaction costs remain low. Given that we need rapid advances regarding 
robust methodological approaches to define baselines for the introduction of 
mitigation policy instruments, and to determine additionality of the interven-
tions, an increase in transparency of those initiatives with the boldest scopes, 
such as TCAF, would be beneficial.
With regards to sustainable development, most initiatives refer to SDGs, 
and some, like the Swiss pilot activities, operate negative lists, but the con-
crete ways to eliminate problematic initiatives are not specified, leaving a lot 
of discretion. The JCM has the explicit aim to cover project types that were 
excluded from the CDM, looking specifically into high-efficiency coal power 
plants, a technology category that is seen by many as unsustainable. 
Some pilots implement concrete approaches to issues that remain under 
negotiation on the international level. For example, the NEFCO-Peru Concep-
tual Pilot defines its baseline on the basis of the unconditional pledge and 
includes the condition that Peru is overachieving its NDC. The corresponding 
adjustment would be undertaken at the moment of transfer. 
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Overall, the landscape of Article 6 pilots is still fuzzy and relevant trends are 
still emerging. Critical questions, especially with regard to incentive structures 
that drive private sector engagement, baseline credibility for upscaled credit-
ing and operationalization of sustainable development safeguards, have not 
yet been answered. 
It would certainly be beneficial if critical issues were addressed head on with 
a high degree of transparency.
In terms of the Article 6 negotiations, the ongoing pilots are already, and have 
always been, influential. There is a high degree of convergence between the 
positions Parties take in the negotiations, with the features of the pilots they 
support. Parties are shaping their pilot activities in a way that reflects their 
position in the negotiations and are informed in their position building by 
the pilot experiences. In addition, Parties are paying close attention that the 
operationalization of the Article 6 rules does not negatively impact their coop-
erative schemes. Resolving critical technical questions on the pilot level may 
therefore hold the key towards the successful conclusion of the negotiations. 
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ANNEX I:  FACTSHEETS 
ON ARTICLE 6 PILOTS 
African Development Bank
The Adaptation Benefit 
Mechanism 
The ADB Article 6 Support Facility 
aims to provide capacity building, 
technical and policy support for 
member countries to develop and 
pilot Article 6 activities
Asian Development Bank
Article 6 Support Facility
The ABM is the first attempt to 
operationalize a mechanism that 
supports adaptation activities 
through quantifying, verifying and 
certifying sustainable development 
benefits
Canada - Chile  
Program to reduce emissions 
in the waste sector
Canada is supporting Chile to pilot 
innovative approaches for the 
reduction of methane emissions in 
the waste sector and exploration 
of ITMO transfers
Japan 
The Joint Crediting Mechanism 
The JCM establishes a bilateral 
crediting mechanism between 
Japan and developing host 
countries
NEFCO - Peru
Cooperative arrangement pilot 
in the solid waste sector
The conceptual pilot study pro-
vides an overall framework for 
Peru and a partner country to 
voluntarily engage in the transfer 
of ITMOs from its SWS NAMA
Swedish Energy Agency  
A virtual pilot study in Nigeria
A virtual pilot was developed 
within the Nigerian country con-
text, that combines the use of Arti-
cle 6 and sovereign green bonds to 
expand energy access
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Switzerland 
Pilot activities of the Climate 
Cent Foundation 
The CCF utilizes a voluntary 
approach to invest in mitigation 
projects abroad and account 
purchased emission reduction 
certificates towards the Swiss 
NDC
Switzerland
ITMO purchase program of the 
KliK Foundation
The KliK foundation is setting up 
the procedures for the purchase 
of ITMOs from 2021 onwards
World Bank
The Standardized Crediting 
Framework 
The SCF was developed in antic-
ipation of the future policy land-
scape under the Paris Agree-
ment and more specifically, 
transitioning projects and PoA’s 
under the CDM to Article 6 coop-
erative approaches
World Bank
The Transformative Carbon 
Asset Facility 
Aims to test various methods 
to transfer measurable, report-
able and verifiable mitigation 
outcomes between Parties to 
provide stringent accounting and 
transparency
World Bank
The Warehouse Facility 
This initiative envisages to set up 
an infrastructure for the stan-
dardized assessment, recording 
and transferring of mitigation 
outcomes to match mitigation 
activities with buyers
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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: 
THE ADAPTATION BENEFIT 
MECHANISM
The Adaptation Benefit Mechanism (ABM) aims to mobilize public and private 
sector finance to enhance adaptation action, proposed and piloted by the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) in several African countries. The ABM is the 
first attempt to operationalize a mechanism that supports adaptation activ-
ities. Established in 2016, in collaboration with the governments of Uganda 
and Ivory Coast and in consultation with various stakeholders, the ABM aims 
to quantify, verify and certify its sustainable development benefits of adapta-
tion action using results-based finance. As a candidate for non-market-based 
approaches under Article 6.8 of the PA, the AMB plans to launch its pilot 
phase in 2019. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Any technology/sector where adaptation benefits can 
be delivered and quantified. Requires design/availability 
of robust methodologies for the quantification and MRV 
of the adaptation benefits. Existing pilot methodologies 
include: renewable water pumping technologies, clean 
cooking, grid extension, watershed management and 
off-grid electrification sectors.
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Parties to UNFCCC, NGOs, private investors, philanthropic 
organizations, development banks
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Article 6.8 (non-market approaches)
Relationship to NDC
Contribution to the achievement of the adaptation com-
ponent of NDC. Accounting of emission reductions con-
tribution to be elaborated for projects with mitigation 
co-benefits.
Volume and price of 
ITMOs
No ITMOs will be generated, since the adaptation benefit 
units (ABU) will cover only the impacts of adaptation actions. 
The price of these units is based on the cost of implementa-
tion; thus, it varies depending on the technology/measure 
applied, sector and location of the activity implemented.
Sustainable 
development benefits
Depending on the activity implemented: in general terms 
enhanced resilience of communities in host countries, spe-
cific SDG contributions to be described in methodologies 
and PDDs
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KEY FACTS
The ABM is considered a non-market-based mechanism that generates 
so-called adaptation benefit units (ABUs) that are not internationally tradable, 
and will instead be delivered directly to the end-user. The ABM builds on the 
concept of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementa-
tion (JI), in which carbon credits are issued for mitigation impacts achieved 
against a baseline scenario, and considers their approach to using approved 
methodologies that specify MRV requirements to ensure transparencyThe 
ABM can be implemented in any sector relevant for adaptation. Activities 
must contribute to the implementation of the adaptation component of the 
host Party’s NDC and be additional, i.e. would not be implemented in the 
selected sector/country without the incentive provided by the ABM. Initial 
methodology concepts have been developed for a number of pilot coun-
tries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda) with a complete methodology and PDD for 
each project type9. Robust MRV requirements will be defined for adaptation 
impacts to ensure that ABUs claimed are real and measurable, and ABUs will 
be defined with a proxy of the adaptation benefits delivered10 to simplify MRV 
requirements and reduce associated costs. 
The AfDB initiated the development of the ABM in early 2016. The govern-
ment of Uganda submitted a proposal to the SBSTA 46 and the government 
of Ivory Coast to SBSTA 47 for the ABM to support the establishment of 
such mechanisms11. The government of Ethiopia supported the AfDB with 
the development of pilot methodologies and PDDs12. The AfDB now plans 
to launch the pilot phase for ABM from 2019 - 2023, which will include 10-15 
small-scale replicable or scalable demonstration activities in Africa. The AfDB 
also aims to establish an interim ABM Board, Methodology Panel and Secre-
tariat to enable full support and advice during the piloting phase13.
The governance structure therefore, is envisioned to resemble that of 
the CDM/JI, including third party validation and verification, host country 
approval, a centralized supervisory body for approving methodologies, reg-
istering projects, issuing adaptation benefits and being responsible for the 
overall governance and management of the ABM. A new or existing body, 
such as the Adaptation Committee could take on this role. 
Local communities would benefit the most from the ABM and the mechanism 
is deemed particularly suitable for adaptation activities in rural or low-income 
areas where climate impacts are more significant. Private sector entities, local 
governments, local NGOs or non-profit organizations are good candidates to 
develop adaptation activities under the ABM.
Once the activities, governance structure and beneficiary process are in place, 
ABUs generated can be used to contribute to the achievement of ND adapta-
tion goals, as well as SDGs. Investors already interested in ABM activities, are 
comprised of development organizations, multilateral and bilateral agencies, 
and various funds (including the Green Technology Fund), philanthropic orga-
nizations and private entities wanting to meet Corporate Social Responsibility 
9 Methodologies and PDDs that have been 
developed: renewable energy powered water 
pumping technologies, clean cooking, grid 
extension sectors; while they are not yet 
developed for off-grid electrif ication and 
watershed management.
10 For instance, the m3 of water supplied 
for agricultural uses is a proxy of other 
adaptation benefits such as increased 
resilience of cultivations, reduced 
dependency on rainfall patterns, reduced 
poverty, etc.
11 Government of Cote d’Ivoire. Submission 
by the Government of Cote d’Ivoire to SBSTA 
47 in response to the call for input on the 
Framework for Non-Market Approaches 
described in Articles 6.8 and 6.9 of the Paris 
Agreement. 2017
12 Michaelowa, A.; Hoch, S.; Brescia, D.; 
Friedmann, V. Enhancing Sustainable 
Development in Ethiopia through Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation. AfDB/2017
13 AfDB. Adaptation Benefit Mechanism. N.d.
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requirements, reporting requirements or specific policies on climate-related 
activities. The ABUs are held in a publicly accessible registry and can be sold 
to an interested third party, thus generating revenue for project developers. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION
The ABM is envisioned to be recognized as one of the non-market-based 
approaches under the Article 6.8 of the PA. Cooperation under the ABM could 
comprise public-public, public-private or private-private purchase agree-
ments, such as off-take agreements for payment upon delivery of certified 
ABUs. While there is currently a lack of certainty regarding the key elements 
of Article 6.8 and how these will be relevant for the ABM. Given the increas-
ing importance of enhancing resilience and delivering adaptation finance, the 
ABM’s non-market approach could gain multilateral support.
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
Since ABUs are not internationally tradable, exchanges are based on volun-
tary agreements between potential buyers and project developers. However, 
there is currently no precedent or plan for an ABU-based financial transac-
tion. The amount of ABUs that could be generated depends on the activity 
type as well as how adaptation benefits are quantified: for a solar power irri-
gation project in Ethiopia for instance, one ABU is suggested to be defined 
as 100 m3 of water supplied for agricultural irrigation purposes. Other met-
rics can be used depending on the project type. ABU prices are influenced 
by the eligible costs for the implementation of each activity (eligible costs 
are identified in the methodology), and a project specific premium for the 
developers - for indicative purposes, the price for ABUs from the solar power 
irrigation activity in Ethiopia are estimated at circa 3 to 5 USD/ABU. The price 
thus varies depending on the activity type, location of the activities, and how 
these elements affect the implementation costs. ABU buyers will receive the 
cancellation codes for the ABUs with the ABM registry so that no further trade 
is possible. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
A LoA from the host country will ensure that ABM activities are linked directly 
to host countries’ NDCs as well as other relevant climate policies and priori-
ties. The ABM does not directly target mitigation activities and therefore no 
corresponding adjustments are required. An open question seems to be how 
to account for mitigation co-benefits of ABM-supported activities, although 
it is clear that the intention is not to export any mitigation outcomes, and 
that these are accounted within NDCs. The ABM can also contribute to the 
development of quantifiable targets and related metrics for adaptation com-
ponents under NDCs.
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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK:  
ARTICLE 6 SUPPORT FACILITY
MARKET READINESS SUPPORT  
FOR ASIAN COUNTRIES
The Article 6 Support Facility of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aims to 
provide capacity building, technical and policy support for member countries 
to develop and pilot Article 6 activities. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
All
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
All / member countries of MDB
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Mostly technical assistance
Relationship to NDC
To support NDC implementation and increase 
overall ambition
Sustainable 
development benefits
Desired
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KEY FACTS
The ADB Article 6 Support Facility14 will provide capacity building and techni-
cal support to developing member countries (DMCs) to help them to identify, 
develop and test mitigation actions under the framework of Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement. With its Carbon Market Program (CMP), the ADB is support-
ing DMCs to advance and implement market-based approaches under the 
Paris Agreement. Through this support, the ADB is aiming to play a leadership 
role in the development of post-2020 carbon markets in Asia.
The ADB Article 6 Support Facility is financially supported by Germany and Swe-
den with an overall project budget of USD 4 million15. Only recently launched 
at COP24 in Katowice, the facility is still at an early stage of implementation16.
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION
Twenty-six countries in Asia and the Pacific have expressed their willingness 
to use carbon pricing, including international carbon markets, as a key tool 
for NDC implementation. The ADB aims to support its members engaging in 
mitigation actions under Article 6 to better understand the specific require-
ments and associated accounting systems that they will need to manage. 
Other areas of support will include sustainable development benefits, and 
ensuring environmental integrity and transparency. The support facility will 
mediate the guidance, rules and procedures from the Paris Rulebook (once 
Article 6 is operationalized) towards developing member countries and can 
translate these rules into the country context and potential pilot activities. 
14 ADB. Regional: Establishing a Support 
Facility for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. 
2019
15 ADB. ADB to Partner on New $4 
Million Facility to Help Asia Meet Climate 
Commitments. December 7, 2018
16 ADB. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: 
Piloting for Enhanced Readiness. November, 
2018
“We are confident that this facility will help deliver 
the critical practical experience, innovation, and 
learning necessary for our developing member 
countries to meet their emissions targets.”  
 
ADB Sustainable Development and Climate Change 
Department Director General Mr. Woochong Um
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CANADA-CHILE: PROGRAM 
TO REDUCE EMISSIONS IN 
THE WASTE SECTOR
The Canada-Chile Agreement on Environment Cooperation entered into force 
in July 1997 in parallel to the bilateral Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
and provides a framework for bilateral cooperation on environmental issues. 
Within the context of this cooperation and in light of the ratification of the 
Paris Agreement in 2016, Canada has offered financial and technical support 
to Chile to deploy technologies and to pilot innovative approaches supporting 
the reduction of methane emissions in the waste sector through the pro-
gram titled “Reciclo Orgánicos” (the “Program”).17 This Program is seen as a 
concrete example and opportunity for exploring options for the international 
exchange of mitigation outcomes within the framework of Article 6.
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Waste sector, Organic waste (Main technolo-
gies: Composting, Anaerobic Digestion, Land-
fill Gas Capture)
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Ministry of Environment and Climate Change 
Canada; Ministry of Environment Chile; local 
Municipalities, four cities included in the pilot 
and its citizens (Viña del Mar, Molina, Concep-
ción, Rancagua). 
Overall resources 
available (million $)
USD 5.3 million (CAD 7 million)
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Instrument-neutral under article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. Exploring article 6.2 as an option.
Relationship to NDC
Contribution to the achievement of the NDC 
mitigation goals. 
Volume and price of 
ITMOs
The 4-year Program will be implemented 
between 2017 and 2021 and provides CAD 
7 million for capacity building and technical 
assistance.18 The price of any resulting GHG 
units is not yet determined.
Sustainable 
development benefits
The Program will help to protect the soil, water 
bodies and improve air quality as well as offer 
support to the communities through learning 
plans and training.
17 Reciclo Organicos. Program. 2018
18 Reciclo Organicos. Program. 2018
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KEY FACTS
Chile’s unconditional NDC target is to reduce GHG emissions per unit of GDP 
by 30% below 2007 levels by 2030. With international support this target 
could increase to 35 - 45%19. The 4-year Canada-Chile Program is scheduled 
to operate between 2017 and 2021 and provide CAD 7 million of funding for 
capacity building as well as technical assistance to support clean innovation 
and reduce methane emissions from existing landfills while diverting organic 
matter from landfills. The Program has four overarching objectives:
•  reduction of methane emissions through technology deployment in 
selected cities;
•  tracking, monitoring and reporting emission reductions as well as explor-
ing opportunities for new and innovative cooperative arrangements such 
as ITMO transfers;
•  leveraging co-financing from public and private sector partners for the 
planned projects as well as creating the financial conditions to enable 
scaled-up implementation by engaging with international financial institu-
tions and multilateral development banks; and
• providing technical support for communications opportunities.
The key stakeholders of the Program are the Canadian Ministry of Environment 
and Climate Change and the Chilean Ministry of Environment. The main benefi-
ciaries include the Government of Chile, as well as the local municipalities in which 
the pilots are being developed (Viña del Mar, Molina, Concepción, Rancagua).20
The governance structure around the generation of ITMOs is not yet defined 
and will be clarified at a later stage by Canada and Chile in consideration of 
the rules being developed for Article 6. Feasibility studies are currently being 
developed and conducted in piloting cities/municipalities to test various tech-
nologies. The MRV system will help to ensure the credibility and robustness 
of the emission reductions achieved, building on the experience of the CDM21. 
It will contribute to: 
• develop GHG plans and reporting templates for each activity;
•  support onsite MRV for all activities, including smart metering and linking 
to digital technologies (e.g. blockchain) for innovative MRV solutions; and
• compile and report the results for all projects.
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The Program is designed as instrument-neutral under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. However, the Program explicitly highlights that it will “explore 
considerations for bilateral discussions for mitigation transfers”22. In this 
context, both countries are considering the opportunity to pilot the use of 
GHG units to be counted towards the achievement of NDC objectives. In the 
case of any international transfers, Article 6.2. rules for ITMO transfers will be 
observed. The results of the pilots will take into account ongoing institutional 
reforms in the Chilean waste sector, which could make it easier for Chile to 
19 Republic of Chile. Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution of Chile towards the 
Climate Agreement of Paris 2015. September 
2015.
20 Ministry of Environment of Chile. Chile y 
Canada se unen para apoyar el Desarrollo 
sostenible. 2018
21 Reciclo Organicos. MRV.2018
22 Franck Portalupi, Environment and Climate 
Change Canada. Canada-Chile Program to 
reduce Emissions in the Waste Management 
Sector. January 2018.
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integrate regulatory provisions needed for exchanging mitigation outcomes 
as well as providing incentives for private investments.
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
The Program is still at the early stage of implementation and will firstly focus 
on implementation technologies and capacity building before defining and 
testing the infrastructure for the generation of ITMOs. Through the devel-
opment of a potential ITMO pilot, the Program aims to send a signal to the 
private sector that carbon markets are effective, leverage existing potential 
opportunities and replicate the cooperative approach in other jurisdictions. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
The Program aims to support Chile’s NDC implementation in the waste sector, 
which is identified as one of the country’s priority sectors. The use of emis-
sion reductions that may be generated is still to be decided. Other key objec-
tives are the improvement of the waste management processes, protecting 
the soil and water bodies, improving air quality, developing MRV frameworks, 
and supporting local communities and capacity building.
The Program has been envisioned to not only identify opportunities to cap-
ture landfill gas from existing waste disposal sites, but also to implement proj-
ects to divert organic residues from the municipal waste stream and utilize 
them in composting facilities or anaerobic digestion plants to produce com-
post and/or a source of clean energy. The Program works with four munic-
ipalities, where the Government of Canada provides financial and technical 
assistance for the operationalization of a waste treatment plant (Composting, 
Anaerobic Digestion, Landfill Gas Capture depending on the city) as well as 
community engagement to raise awareness among the residents on the ben-
efits of recovery and utilization of organic waste.
Besides technology deployment and emission reductions, Canada and Chile 
are working together towards:
•  strengthening MRV and develop capacity-building for tracking, monitoring, 
and reporting emission reductions; Currently developing 3 new GHG veri-
fication protocols: Landfill gas, Anaerobic Digestion, Composting;
•  identifying mitigation activities and technologies to contribute to the NDC 
targets;
•  developing incentive for partners to replicate the model in other commu-
nities/facilities or make information available to other jurisdictions espe-
cially the members of the Pacific Alliance; and
• bilateral discussions on the international transfer of mitigation outcomes.
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JAPAN: THE JOINT 
CREDITING MECHANISM
Japan established the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)23 in 2010 to promote 
and enhance its bilateral cooperation with various developing countries. The 
JCM is a crediting framework that facilitates the implementation of mitigation 
actions as well as low carbon technologies and infrastructures to contrib-
ute to the reduction of GHG emissions in developing countries24. Japan has 
already signed agreements with 17 countries from across the globe25, and 
has in place 41 registered projects, 66 approved methodologies for various 
sectors, and 19 credit issuances totalling circa 21,80026 (tCO²eq). 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
All sectors and technologies are eligible, pro-
vided an approved baseline and monitoring 
methodology is available.
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Government of Japan, governments of host 
countries, Joint Committees that serve as 
country-specific governing bodies for JCM 
Implementation, private and public entities 
(project implementers), third party entities.
Overall resources 
available (million $)
Budget for projects starting from 2018-2020 is 
circa USD 69 million27. 
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
The JCM could transition to an Article 6.2 coop-
erative approach.
Relationship to NDC
Contributes to the achievement Japans’ and 
host countries’ NDC targets. 
Volume and price of 
ITMOs
Over 21,800 credits (each credit equals one 
tCO²eq) issued so far. No price attached to 
credits (non-tradable credits). 
Sustainable 
development benefits
Some general provision for contributing to 
sustainable development of host countries, 
however design documents should capture 
information on sustainable development. 
23 The scheme was named “Bilateral Offset 
Crediting Mechanism (BOCM)” until 2013.
24 GoJ. Japan’s Nationally Determined 
Contributions. 2016
25 Mongolia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Maldives, Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Costa 
Rica, Palau, Cambodia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
Chile, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand
26 Volume of issued credits varies signif icantly, 
from a minimum of 11 credits to a maximum 
value of almost 9,000. 
27 GoJ. Recent Development of The Joint 
Crediting Mechanism ( JCM). 2018
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KEY FACTS
The JCM aims to cooperate with developing countries to reduce GHG emis-
sions that can be assessed and channelled toward the NDC achievement of 
both Japan and partnering countries. In doing so, the Mechanism ultimately 
intends to lower the load on developing countries and promote the diffusion 
of low-carbon and high-efficiency technologies and actions. 
To cooperate under the JCM, partnering countries sign an agreement with the 
Government of Japan (GoJ) and present their proposed project activity based 
on country-specific methodologies approved by the respective Joint Commit-
tee (JC)28. The JC functions as the Secretariat of the JCM and provides guidance 
on MRV and accounting rules, and approve methodologies and projects. The 
evaluation and approval phase of a proposed project activity, resembles that 
of the CDM registration and issuance process. 
A number of activities are implemented under the JCM to facilitate the pro-
cess and implementation, including feasibility studies and MRV application 
studies, as well as demonstration and model projects. Feasibility and MRV-re-
lated studies serve to develop strategic projects and to evaluate usefulness 
and robustness of MRV methodologies. Demonstration projects serve to test 
the effectiveness of advanced low-carbon technologies.
The key stakeholders under the JCM include the New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organization (NEDO)under the Ministry of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry (METI), and Japan’s Ministry of Environment (MoE). 
The former supports feasibility and MRV-related studies to develop strate-
gic projects and to evaluate MRV methodologies while the latter supports 
demonstration projects to testthe groundwork for disseminating low-carbon 
technologies. Other relevant stakeholders are the host country governments 
in which the activities are implemented, as well as project owners, develop-
ers and technology providers that are involved in the design, implementation 
and operation of the project activity. Third party verification is mandatory 
and performed by the Third-Party Entities29. 
28 The Joint Committee acts as the Secretariat 
of the JCM and works to develop/revise 
rules, guidelines and methodologies, the 
registration of projects and discusses the 
implementation of the JCM. 
29 Third Party Entities are eligible under the 
JCM if they are accredited under the ISO 
14065 or if they are already a DOE under the 
CDM. JCM (n.d.): Joint Crediting Mechanism 
Guidelines for Designation as a Third-Party 
Entity. 
Figure 4: Structure of the JCM 
(Source: GoJ, 2018) 
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INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION
The JCM was established prior to the Paris Agreement, and thus Article 6 
cooperative approaches. While the Mechanism was therefore not developed 
on the basis of the emerging Article 6 rules and guidelines, it has the poten-
tial to transition into an Article 6.2 cooperative approach. Article 6.2 is antici-
pated to be flexible enough to enable the JCM to retain its bilateral coopera-
tion structure. The JCM could however also register under Article 6.4.
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
Credits issued under the JCM are allocated directly to Japan and the part-
nering country. The credits generated currently have no price attached to 
them, meaning they are non-tradable, however, Parties can explore options 
for trading in the future, depending on continued developments under the 
UNFCCC. It is therefore also not yet clear whether the credits issued directly 
to partnering country accounts would qualify as ITMOs under Article 6. 
A JCM registry system has been made available, however, since 2015, whereby 
issued credits can be tracked and accounted for. Partnering countries have 
the option of applying this registry system or opt for their own, or simpli-
fied registry. To avoid double counting of credits, environmental integrity is 
explicitly addressed in the signed agreements between the GoJ and partner-
ing countries, where both sides agree to not use mitigation projects under the 
JCM for the purpose of other international climate mitigation mechanisms.  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
The JCM is addressed in Japan’s NDC as through its contribution to emission 
reductions and diffusion of low-carbon technologies, the Mechanism sup-
ports the achievement of its NDC goals30. Japan currently reports the use of 
the JCM in its Biennial Reports. The JCM is anticipated to achieve 50-100 mil-
lion tCO²eq through the GoJ budget until 2030
31. 
30 GoJ. Japan’s Nationally Determined 
Contributions. 2016
31 GoJ. Japan’s Nationally Determined 
Contributions. 2016
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NEFCO-PERU: COOPERATIVE 
ARRANGEMENT PILOT IN THE 
SOLID WASTE SECTOR
The Nordic Partnership Initiative (NPI) supported the Peruvian Government 
with the development of a conceptual Pilot Cooperative Arrangement for its 
Solid Waste Sector (SWS).32 The NEFCO-Peru Conceptual Pilot33 provides an 
overall framework for Peru and a partner country to voluntarily engage in 
the transfer of ITMOs from its SWS Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
(NAMA). The SWS NAMA, an upscaled mitigation program which aims to min-
imize waste disposal and increase waste recovery, requires an estimated 
financial contribution of approximately USD 47.5 million. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Peruvian Solid Waste Sector 
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Private and public stakeholders poten-
tially including governments, public-private 
agencies, landfill or composting operators, 
waste companies, and other possible project 
developers. 
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Instrument neutral. Focus on establishing a 
scaled-up crediting mechanism. 
Relationship to NDC
The conceptual pilot is focused on the solid 
waste sector, covered by the Peruvian NDC. 
However, only those emission reductions 
from technologies or activities deemed to go 
beyond the NDC target would be considered 
ITMOs. 
Volume and price of 
ITMOs
N/A
Sustainable 
development benefits
Improved waste management systems lead 
to a number of sustainable development 
benefits, including reducing local pollution, 
the dissemination of diseases, and preventing 
water and soil contamination. 
32 See the Nordic Partnership Initiative in 
Peruvian waste sector Homepage for more 
information and a full description of the Pilot 
Cooperative Arrangement for the SWS in Peru.
33 As a conceptual study, the pilot is not 
off icially endorsed by the stakeholders 
involved and no commitments to the 
implementation of the pilot have been made.
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KEY FACTS
With the support of the NPI, the Peruvian Government is designing and imple-
menting a NAMA in the Solid Waste Sector. The Peruvian waste sector is the third 
largest contributor to national GHG emissions, and solid waste accounts for 77% 
of the waste sector’s emissions.34 The SWS NAMA comprises regulatory and pol-
icy changes in the waste sector, the implementation of mitigation projects and 
the introduction of a revolving loan fund to channel international finance. 
On this basis, a conceptual Article 6 Pilot Cooperative Arrangement35 was 
designed to illustrate how Peru could potentially tap into additional finance 
streams while accommodating domestic priorities, emerging rules under 
Article 6 as well as other provisions of the Paris rulebook. The conceptual 
Pilot comprises the conditions needed for generating ITMOs from the SWS 
NAMA and their transfer to a partner (buying) country. It also considers the 
provision of upfront support to the host country to further refine its MRV 
systems on the national and sectoral level, as well as to enhance the engage-
ment of the private sector to finance and implement the essential actions 
needed in the SWS. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The Pilot Cooperative Arrangement is designed as instrument neutral. This 
means that Peru and the partner country have the flexibility to roll-out eli-
gible SWS NAMA activities in accordance with Article 6.2 (once domestic and 
sectoral MRV systems are complete). Alternatively, Article 6.4 may also be 
used, in particular during the initial phase of piloting where domestic MRV 
capacities might be lower. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
The waste sector is incorporated in the Peruvian NDC. Any possible implemen-
tation of the conceptual pilot in the host country, as well as the host country’s 
willingness to engage in the transaction of ITMOs through either Article 6.2 or 
6.4, would depend on how it supports the country in meeting its own NDC. 
The Pilot suggests that the cooperating countries could establish a multi-year 
emissions trajectory for each NDC cycle. This trajectory would serve as an indic-
ative, non-binding accounting reference for the countries to measure Peru’s 
overall performance over time. It would thus become an accounting benchmark 
valid at bilateral/contracting level only. To estimate the generation of ITMOs 
from the SWS NAMA, the Pilot would define an SWS crediting baseline that 
reflects the NDC unconditional pledge. The actual emission reductions leading 
to ITMOs would then be measured, reported and verified independently.
To avoid overselling ITMOs that are relevant for NDC achievement, the sug-
gested pilot transaction is conditional on Peru being on track to over-achiev-
ing its NDC (or a sectoral target for the waste sector that could be agreed 
between Peru and the partner country) and on the generation of emission 
34 SINIA. National Greenhouse Gas Inventory. 
INGEI. 2012
35 Climate Focus. Opportunities for the 
Implementation of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement in the Solid Waste Sector in Peru. 
2018
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reductions from pre-selected SWS NAMA activities and technologies that rep-
resent an effort beyond the NDC target. 
Irrespective of the Article 6 cooperative approach chosen, the Pilot suggests 
that any transfer of ITMOs or Article 6.4 units would be met with a correspond-
ing adjustment by the host country at the moment of transfer (unless other-
wise stipulated by emerging Article 6.2 guidance), to prevent double counting. 
$¹ ²
Figure 5: Pilot Cooperative 
Arrangement Structure; 
Source: Climate Focus 
(2018) Opportunities for the 
Implementation of Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement in the Solid 
Waste Sector in Peru. NEFCO.
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TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
The intended form of cooperation considered in the conceptual pilot is a gov-
ernment-to-government transaction between Peru and a partner country. It 
entails a call option structure whereby the partner country has the right – but 
is not required to – purchase ITMOs from the Peruvian SMS NAMA at an agreed 
prospective date and unit strike price. If the call option is not exercised, ITMOs 
may be used by Peru for its own NDC achievement or sold to third Parties.  
In return for the right granted to a partner country by Peru, the partner coun-
try would pay a negotiated call option premium to be disbursed in tranches 
according to pre-agreed payment milestones. The upfront payments fol-
lowing pre-agreed milestones would allow Peru to further develop its MRV 
capacities and to kick-start the implementation of mitigation actions in the 
Peruvian waste sector. The precise pre-agreed milestones would be tailored 
to support on-going market readiness efforts as well as kick-start the SWS 
NAMA, and would be agreed in a Mitigation Outcome Purchase Agreement 
(‘MOPA’). These payment milestones could include the establishment of a 
multi-year emissions trajectory, agreed to by both parties, or Peru having its 
domestic MRV and registry in place. 
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SWEDISH ENERGY AGENCY: 
A VIRTUAL PILOT STUDY 
IN NIGERIA 
The Swedish Energy Agency (SEA) commissioned an Article 6 Virtual Pilot 
Study36 to explore how Article 6 can be utilized to promote electrification in 
host countries. The study borrows country contexts to develop a conceptual 
Article 6 virtual pilot. On this basis, the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot was devel-
oped using the Nigerian country context and combines the use of Article 6 
and sovereign green bonds to expand energy access. The SEA-Nigeria Virtual 
Pilot foresees the issuance of two types of sovereign green bonds to mobi-
lize finance and enable the host country to exceed a mini-grid implemen-
tation benchmark derived from its NDC target. Mitigation outcomes gener-
ated through the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot that go beyond the host country’s 
unconditional mitigation target would be made available to international 
investors as Article 6.4 units. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Renewable energy, mini-grids  
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Countries, (private) investors, project developers and rural communities 
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Initially Article 6.4. In the future, and depending on the evolution of the 
host country domestic MRV capacities as well as the outcome of Article 6 
negotiations, the host country’s domestic energy access crediting program 
as a whole could potentially be credited under Article 6.4. 
Relationship to NDC
• The Pilot contributes to the host country’s renewable energy targets.
• The host country’s performance against a pre-defined unconditional 
mini-grid implementation target derived from the NDC target determines 
which mitigation outcomes generated through the Virtual Pilot may be 
transferred to investors abroad.
• The pay-out of bond claims is aligned with host country’s NDC cycle.
Volume and price of 
ITMOs
3.35 million tCO2e
37
Sustainable 
development benefits
The Virtual Pilot contributes to SDG 7 (universal access to affordable, 
reliable and modern energy services by 2030, and a substantial increase 
of the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix) and SDG 13 
(integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies 
and planning). 
36 The Virtual 
Pilot does not 
represent any official 
endorsement or 
commitment to 
implementing an 
Article 6 pilot by 
Sweden.
37 The volume 
and price follow 
from a number 
of assumptions, 
including the total 
mini-grid potential 
of the host country, 
and a projection of 
the unconditional/
conditional ratio of 
the NDC mitigation 
targets on the host 
country ’s mini-grid 
target. 
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KEY FACTS
The SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot commissioned by the SEA develops a possible 
blueprint for Article 6 cooperation promoting energy access in Nigeria, using 
the incentive of sovereign green bonds to tap into the financing potential of 
capital markets and to diversify the investor base. 
Given the modest profitability of mini-grid investments, commercial finance 
remains a barrier for scaling up decentralized renewable energy. Green bond 
proceeds in the form of concessional loans may be used to improve the 
risk-return profile of mini-grid investments. Building on the host country’s 
first successful green bond issuance in 2017 and its recently enacted domes-
tic guidelines for green bonds, the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot foresees the issu-
ance of a second green bond in Nigeria.
The funds generated through the bond issuance would be earmarked for 
eligible mini-grids, and directly on-lent in the form of concessional loans to 
project developers. Two types of green bonds would be offered by the host 
country under the suggested SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot concept:
•  Green bond with embedded claim to mitigation outcomes. This bond 
offers a claim on generated mitigation outcomes produced by the Virtual 
Pilot, in return for lower coupon rates throughout the duration of the bond. 
The embedded claim gives investors the possibility to lock-in a certain vol-
ume of mitigation outcomes, potentially benefitting from an increase in 
market value of mitigation outcomes in the future. 
•  Regular green bond. A sovereign green bond which offers a payout 
structure at a market-rate coupon rate, and no claim to mitigation out-
comes. This bond targets traditional investors looking for climate-friendly 
investments, which would only be approached in case there is insufficient 
investor appetite for green bonds with an embedded claim to mitigation 
outcomes. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The implementation of renewable energy mini-grids through the SEA-Ni-
geria Virtual Pilot is based on existing CDM methodologies and would be 
implemented, at least initially, in the form of (one or more) PoAs. The Virtual 
Pilot first seeks to have Article 6.4 units issued by the Article 6.4 Supervisory 
Board. Article 6.4 offers a centralized crediting mechanism directly governed 
by a UNFCCC body. Article 6.4 can provide a global and universally accepted 
standard for generating emission reductions. As the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot 
proposes an innovative structure that combines sovereign green bonds and 
carbon credits, aiming to attract a large and diverse pool of possible inves-
tors, Article 6.4 may provide, at least initially, a robust route for certifying and 
tracking emission reductions.  
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RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
The implementation of solar-PV decentralized mini-grids aligns with the Nige-
rian decentralized renewable energy targets, as decentralized measures, such 
as off-grid solar PV, have been identified as a ‘priority activity’ in the Nigerian 
NDC. Moreover, the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot is aligned with the unconditional 
NDC target to establish 13 GW of renewable electricity to rural communities 
that are currently off-grid. 
The SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot extrapolates the host country’s unconditional 
emission reduction targets to the energy sector and the decentralized mini-
grid component in particular. This exercise results in an assumed trajectory 
of mini-grid implementation throughout the NDC implementation timeframe. 
Only those emission reductions achieved beyond this pre-established mini-
grid implementation benchmark would be available for international trans-
fers to bondholders. 
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
Green bonds coupled with Article 6.4 units would be available to bondhold-
ers opting for this category of bonds.  The green bond is aligned with the 
host country’s NDC cycle, and the host country’s performance against the 
pre-defined mini-grid implementation target determines the degree to which 
mitigation outcomes may be transferred abroad. Therefore, the availability 
of Article 6.4 units would be dependent on the host-country performance 
against this benchmark. In the instance that the host country is on track to 
(over-)achieve its unconditional implementation level, mitigation outcomes 
are available for international transfer. Where the host country does not meet 
its implementation target, investors do not receive mitigation outcomes. 
Investors holding the bonds with an embedded claim on units would be able 
to exercise their claim twice throughout the duration of the bond. The first 
claim would occur upon the conclusion of year 5 (mid-way), the second claim 
at the bond maturation in year 10. The provisions regulating the interna-
tional transfer of the mitigation outcomes are directly incorporated into to 
the terms and conditions of the bond agreement, including provisions on 
transparency and reporting that will regularly inform the bondholders on the 
surplus mitigation outcomes produced by the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot.
Importantly, the SEA-Nigeria Virtual Pilot also proposes that a portion of the 
mitigation outcomes should remain unused (not issued or cancelled) by either 
the investor or host country government to ensure an overall net mitigation.
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SWITZERLAND: PILOT 
ACTIVITIES OF THE CLIMATE 
CENT FOUNDATION 
The Government of Switzerland (GoS) plans to make use of Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement (PA). In its NDC, the country has defined an emission reduc-
tion target of minus 50% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, for which a max-
imum of 20% of the reductions are to be achieved abroad38. Details will be 
specified by the Swiss CO² Law, which is currently undergoing parliamentary 
consultation. The GoS aims to “show that it is possible to meet the clear inter-
national standards demanded by Switzerland regarding sustainable devel-
opment, environmental integrity and the prevention of double counting of 
emission reductions” and to confirm its commitment to upholding interna-
tional market mechanisms39.
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Initial activities: energy efficiency/ efficient 
cookers, electric mobility and landfill 
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
GoS, private sector companies and host 
country(ies)
Overall resources 
available (million $)
Approx. 20 million USD
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Article 6.2, based on a government-to-govern-
ment (G2G) approach with host country and 
buyer country approval and corresponding 
adjustments to GHG inventories
Relationship to NDC
Sectors must be covered in NDC; activities 
must go beyond NDC targets and BAU levels.
Volume and price of 
ITMOs 
Funding of pilot activities with CHF 20 million
Sustainable 
development benefits 
Contribution to sustainable development 
is a central criterion, but no specific rules 
announced yet
38 Federal Office for the Environment. Pilot 
approaches on new market approaches. Last 
accessed January 2019.
39 Climate Cent Foundation. Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation 
represented by the Federal Deportment 
of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) and the Climate 
Cent Foundation regarding the modalities 
governing the use of the Foundation’s assets 
and the support of pilot activities carried 
out abroad in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. September 2016.
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KEY FACTS
The CCF is a voluntary scheme set up by the Swiss business community to 
invest in mitigation projects abroad and hand over purchased emission 
reduction certificates to the GoS. The CCF has been funded through the Kli-
marappen (climate cent), a charge installed by the business community of 1.5 
cent CHF per liter levied on petrol and diesel imports between 2006 to 2012, 
yielding a total revenue of CHF 718 million40. In 2013, the GoS gave a mandate 
to the CCF to use parts of its remaining assets - at least CHF 20 million out 
of total CHF 100 million - to finance pilot activities with interested countries 
and the private sector until 2032. Decisions on pilot projects will be made by 
agreement between the GoS and CCF41. In December 2016, the CCF placed a 
call for proposals for potential pilot activities related to “landfill gas”, “efficient 
cookers” and “grid-connected renewable electricity”. A total of 17 Project Idea 
Notes (PIN) have been submitted and have been analyzed jointly by the CCF 
and the inter-ministerial committee on climate (IDA Klima). Three PINs have 
been retained with a view to potentially develop them into pilot activities: 
Efficient cookers in Peru; Electric vehicles fleet in Thailand; and Incentives for 
the landfill gas sector in Colombia and Mexico, for capture of landfill gas and 
use for electricity generation42. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The pilot activities to be funded by the CCF will be developed in a govern-
ment-to-government (G2G) approach; and has therefore been presented as 
an Article 6.2 initiative. The eligibility criteria for the pilot activities have been 
defined in an agreement between the CCF and the GoS43 and are detailed in 
its appendix44. In general, pilot activities must be consistent with the Swiss 
position in the UNFCCC negotiations and criteria should serve as a basis of 
discussion with potential like-minded progressive partners. In the selection 
of projects, the level of readiness of the host country has been taken into 
account. 
In the context of the selected pilot activity for clean cookstoves in Peru, the 
GoS and Peruvian government announced during COP24 the establishment 
of a fformal dialogue on a bilateral agreement on Art. 6 cooperation based 
on a jointly elaborated white paper and roadmap. The CCF-funded project is 
thought to be the first mitigation activity under this bilateral agreement and 
is expected to become operational in 2021 under this framework. The next 
steps will include the drafting of this bilateral agreement and to refine the 
scope of the first pilot project. The project design document is expected to be 
finalized by end of 201945. 
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
The CCF identified its planned pilot activities according to the eligibility cri-
teria defined. For all pilots, there will be a clear procedure of bilateral coop-
eration, with different project standing currently at different stages in this 
process. The GoS must issue a “no-objection” statement before entering the 
40 Climate Cent Foundation. Portrait. Last 
accessed January 2019.
41 Federal Office for the Environment. Pilot 
approaches on new market approaches. Last 
accessed January 2019.
42 Climate Cent Foundation. Bericht 2016/7 
über die Verwendung der f inanziellen Mittel 
der Stiftung Klimarappen an das Departement 
für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und 
Kommunikation (UVEK) gemäss Vereinbarung 
vom 19. September 2016. June 2017.
43 Climate Cent Foundation. Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation 
represented by the Federal Deportment 
of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) and the Climate 
Cent Foundation regarding the modalities 
governing the use of the Foundation’s assets 
and the support of pilot activities carried 
out abroad in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. September 2016.
44 Federal Office for the Environment. Criteria 
for piloting enhanced market activities. O352-
1563. September 2016.
45 KliK Foundation. Formal dialogue between 
Peru and Switzerland on a bilateral agreement 
under Art 6 (Paris Agreement). White Paper. 
Last accessed January 2019; KliK Foundation. 
Joint Statement by Peru and Switzerland on 
Article 6 Cooperation. Last accessed January 
2019. 
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political dialogue with host countries. A Steering Committee of Section 6 of 
IDA Klima and the Ministry of Environment will then supervise the signing 
of memoranda of understanding (MoUs)46. These memoranda establish the 
intergovernmental safeguards, covering the host country conformity with the 
NDC-related criteria, the type of activities, the principles of the MRV system 
and the accounting rules and allocation of emission reductions among host 
and investor country. 
On this basis, the CCF negotiates a Mitigation Outcomes Purchase Agreement 
(MOPA)47 (CCF 2018a, FOEN 2016). The MOPA defines the price per tCO²eq 
reduced and the termination clauses to cover for host-country non-com-
pliance as well48. CCF is planning to complete the contractual negotiations, 
including the signature of the MOPA for at least one of the pilot activities 
already identified. However, these preparations will probably not be com-
pleted before 202049. Upon the independent verification of emission reduc-
tions, the CCF proceeds to payment upon receipt of the mitigation outcome50. 
The CCF will hand the purchased units to the GoS in 2023 and in 203051. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
The partner countries (Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Thailand) of the CCF have 
submitted a first NDC to the UNFCCC with economy-wide unconditional and 
conditional targets. All countries mention their intention to use international 
market mechanisms. 
The CCF has agreed with the GoS on specific requirements for the pilot activ-
ities with respect to the relationship to NDCs, additionality and further safe-
guards. These criteria are inter alia52: 
-  Host Party must have ratified the Paris Agreement before 31/12/2020 and 
have an NDC that is achieved mainly domestically through own resources. 
-  Activities developed must: 
 •  be additional to the activities in the host countries NDC and the BAU 
scenario, 
 •  generate mitigation outcomes that can likely be used towards Swiss 
NDC.
-  To avoid double counting, GoS will not account the resources used as 
international climate finance if credits are used for realization of own NDC 
commitments. 
- Host country benefits include: 
 •  Activities must contribute to sustainable and low-carbon development 
of the host country and be self-sustaining beyond support
A percentage share of mitigation outcomes to be determined will be attributed 
to host country.
46 Climate Cent Foundation. Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation 
represented by the Federal Deportment 
of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) and the Climate 
Cent Foundation regarding the modalities 
governing the use of the Foundation’s assets 
and the support of pilot activities carried 
out abroad in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. September 2016.
47 It is also referred to as Emission Reduction 
Purchase Agreement (ERPA)
48 Federal Office for the Environment. Criteria 
for piloting enhanced market activities. O352-
1563. September 2016. 
49 Climate Cent Foundation. Bericht 2017/18 
über die Verwendung der f inanziellen Mittel 
der Stiftung Klimarappen an das Departement 
für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und 
Kommunikation (UVEK) gemäss Vereinbarung 
vom 19. September 2016. June 2018.
50 Federal Office for the Environment. Criteria 
for piloting enhanced market activities. O352-
1563. September 2016.
51 Climate Cent Foundation. Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation 
represented by the Federal Deportment 
of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) and the Climate 
Cent Foundation regarding the modalities 
governing the use of the Foundation’s assets 
and the support of pilot activities carried 
out abroad in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. September 2016.
52 Federal Office for the Environment. Criteria 
for piloting enhanced market activities. O352-
1563. September 2016.
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SWITZERLAND: THE ITMO 
PURCHASE PROGRAM OF THE 
KLIK FOUNDATION
The Swiss CO² law foresees the obligation for large fossil fuel importers emit-
ting more than 1000 tCO²e/year to compensate the transport-related CO² 
emissions domestically and abroad53. To fulfill this legal obligation, the KliK 
Foundation for Climate Protection and Carbon Offset (Stiftung Klimaschutz 
und CO²-Kompensation) has been established as a sector-wide carbon off-
set grouping for fossil motor fuels, making it the successor of the Climate 
Cent Foundation (see factsheet on the CCF). The Foundation currently funds 
domestic projects that generate offset credits based on a Swiss carbon stan-
dard54. The CO² law is currently being revised, but will likely allow for a use 
of international offsets55; the exact usage threshold is politically highly con-
tested. The KliK foundation is therefore setting up the procedures for the 
purchase of ITMOs from 2021 onwards.
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
No specification yet
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
GoS, private sector companies and partner 
countries
Overall resources 
available (million $)
Approx. 5 million USD/year
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
Article 6.2, based on a government-to-govern-
ment (G2G) approach with host country and 
buyer country approval and corresponding 
adjustments to GHG inventories
Relationship to NDC
Specific criteria to be set by the revised CO² 
law.
Volume and price of 
ITMOs 
Purchase of credits amounting to 54 million 
tCO²eq from 2021 onwards.
Sustainable 
development benefits 
Contribution to sustainable development is 
mentioned as criterion, no specific rules yet.
53 BAFU. Totalrevision des CO²-Gesetzes. 
November 2018
54 KliK. Homepage. Last accessed January 
2019.
55 Climate Cent Foundation. Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation 
represented by the Federal Deportment 
of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) and the Climate 
Cent Foundation regarding the modalities 
governing the use of the Foundation’s assets 
and the support of pilot activities carried 
out abroad in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. September 2016.
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KEY FACTS
For the period of 2021-2030, the foundation aims to purchase certificates 
from international activities amounting to 54 million tons of CO²eq, at a rate of 
around CHF 5 million per year. At the start of 2019, the foundation published 
a call for private and public partner organizations to submit “Expressions of 
Interest” on planning and implementing mitigation activities that generate 
ITMOs. Following the selection of partner organizations, KliK will launch an 
“open opportunities call” to screen the potential and capacity for activities in 
certain sectors and countries. Any project proposal must be accompanied by 
a “letter of intent” of the respective host country, to enter bilateral talks with 
the GoS56. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The KliK foundation is developing its pilot activities in a government-to-gov-
ernment approach, and therefore as an Article 6.2 activity. As a first step, 
the KliK foundation will build a network of private and public partner orga-
nizations. Government agencies that are in charge of implementing climate 
change policies and instruments have privileged access to the status of part-
ner organization. Private sector partners will have to apply online via the 
foundation’s website57. 
Project developers, consulting firms, investors, non-governmental organiza-
tions, industry associations or companies with particularly high-emission pro-
duction facilities or with access to relevant key technologies are also eligible. 
Accepted partner organizations can participate in the subsequent calls for 
project activities. Before ITMOs can be purchased from an accepted activ-
ity, the host country has to enter a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with the GoS. Therefore, any idea presented would need to be accompanied 
by an official letter from the partner country’s relevant government agency, 
affirming its intention to support the activity and, where appropriate, enter 
in bilateral talks with the Swiss government (“Letter of Intent”). A purchase 
agreement will be signed, only after a selected activity has been recognized 
as suitable by the GoS and the host country58. In the selection process, the 
KliK Foundation will target new priority activities, but will also evaluate exist-
ing stranded projects (e.g. CDM activities) for generating emission reduc-
tions59. Further eligibility criteria will be developed to meet the requirements 
of Article 6 of the PA and activities will need to obtain the approval of the host 
and investor country60.
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
Upon the signing of an MoU between the partner country and the GoS, the 
KliK Foundation can sign purchase agreements. Any agreement for coop-
eration must respect the requirements of Article 6, in particular to ensure 
environmental integrity and transparency, avoid double counting and con-
tribute to sustainable development61. Until the obligations of the Foundation 
are set out in the revised version of the Swiss CO² law, the KliK Foundation 
56 KliK. Invitation to “Expression of Interest”: 
the KliK Foundation is looking for partner 
organisations for the procurement of ITMOs. 
January 2019. KliK. Application form for 
private organisations. February 2019.
57 KliK. Application form for private 
organisations. February 2019.
58 KliK. Invitation to “Expression of Interest”: 
the KliK Foundation is looking for partner 
organisations for the procurement of ITMOs. 
January 2019.
59 Ben Garside. Carbon Forward 2018: 
Switzerland lines up first Paris-era carbon 
trades. Carbon Pulse. October 2018. 
60 KliK. Procedure. Last accessed January 
2019.
61 KliK. Procedure. Last accessed January 
2019; Ben Garside. Carbon Forward 2018: 
Switzerland lines up first Paris-era carbon 
trades. Carbon Pulse. October 2018.
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will build its international portfolio on a provisional basis without entering 
financial commitments62. The adoption of the revised CO² law is expected in 
the last quarter of 2019 and anticipated to enter into force by January 2021, 
when the purchase program of the foundation will be operational to fulfill its 
mandate63. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
Specific criteria for the safeguards and eligibility principles are not yet defined 
and will be based on the Swiss CO² law revision. They will be specified in every 
call for project activities64. It can be assumed that they will not significantly 
deviate from the criteria agreed between the CCF and the GoS (see fact-
sheet on pilot activities of the CCF). For instance, additionality of actions with 
respect to NDC targets will also be an important criterion65. The relationship 
of the ITMOs to be purchased and the NDC of the host country will be clarified 
in close consultation with relevant agencies of the partner countries66. 
62 KliK. Regulatory framework. Last accessed 
January 2019.
63 KliK. Timeline. Last accessed January 2019.
64 KliK. Invitation to “Expression of Interest”: 
the KliK Foundation is looking for partner 
organisations for the procurement of ITMOs.
January 2019.
65 Ben Garside. Carbon Forward 2018: 
Switzerland lines up first Paris-era carbon 
trades. Carbon Pulse. October 2018. 
66 KliK. Invitation to “Expression of Interest”: 
the KliK Foundation is looking for partner 
organisations for the procurement of ITMOs. 
January 2019.
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WORLD BANK: 
THE STANDARDIZED 
CREDITING FRAMEWORK
The Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF) for energy access provides a 
simplified crediting approach that builds on the Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM).67 Innovated by the World Bank’s Carbon Initiative for Develop-
ment (Ci-Dev), the SCF was developed in anticipation of the future policy land-
scape under the Paris Agreement and more specifically, transitioning projects 
and programme of activities (PoAs) under the CDM to Article 6 cooperative 
approaches. SCF pilots have already been launched in Senegal and in Rwanda. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Pilots in Rural Electrification (technologies: 
hybrid solar PV-diesel mini-grid electrification, 
individual solar PV systems and solar lanterns) 
and Improved Cookstoves.
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Parties, project proponents (public and private 
entities), and rural communities. 
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
The SCF is instrument neutral, meaning it 
could fall under Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
Relationship to NDC
The extent to which emission reductions units 
from the SCF Pilot project will contribute to 
Senegal’s NDC target will become clearer after 
the pilot phase and once the crediting process 
starts, with the understanding that NDC com-
mitments may need to be incorporated into 
the baseline for crediting. 
Volume and price of 
ITMOs 
N/A
Sustainable 
development benefits 
Provides energy access to rural communities, 
implementation of household energy access 
projects in low income countries, improved 
cookstoves. 
67 See the Standardized Crediting Framework 
Homepage for more information.
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KEY FACTS
The SCF is an initiative that supports the transition of the Ci-Dev CDM proj-
ect pipeline toward the new governing framework of the Paris Agreement, 
while offering valuable insights and lessons learned to the on-going Article 
6 negotiations. Aiming to advance beyond the current CDM PoA model, the 
SCF establishes a host country governed crediting approach, through which 
the scaling-up and replication of project activities within defined sectors is 
simplified68. Host country governments and institutions can best establish 
the link between crediting and NDC implementation as well as define credit-
ing modalities that are most fitting with national and sectoral circumstances. 
Therefore, they are given the role of managing and implementing the SCF. 
Compared to the CDM, the SCF provides a more simplified project cycle, 
resulting in lower transaction costs. Building on CDM methodologies, the SCF 
uses positive lists of technologies and standardized emission factors based 
on national expertise, cultivating greater host country ownership. Moreover, 
one of the main simplifications includes the ‘listing’ process (i.e. similar to 
registration under the CDM), for which templates and clear guidance is pro-
vided. As well, working together with existing national institutions with exper-
tise in climate change, policies and projects, the SCF minimizes the admin-
istrative and financial burden on national governments while maintaining 
transparency. 
The project cycle introduced under the SCF pilots begins with a simplified pro-
gram document and eventually ends with certification, whereby the valida-
tion and verification steps are combined. For the SCF to become operational 
under Article 6, an issuance step would also be needed.
68 Carbon Limits AS, Climate Focus, Ci-Dev. A 
Standardized Crediting Framework for scaling 
up Energy Access Programs. 2016 
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EXPERIENCES IN SENEGAL AND RWANDA
The SCF is being piloted in Senegal and Rwanda to test the potential of the 
crediting approach and gain lessons for future implementation.
In Senegal, the SCF supports the rural electrification program implemented 
by the Senegalese Rural Electrification Agency - Agence Sénégalaise D‘Electrifi-
cation Rural (ASER). The technologies covered in the pilot include, inter alia, 
grid electrification, hybrid solar PV-diesel mini-grid electrification, individual 
solar PV systems and solar lanterns. The key stakeholders for the Senegalese 
SCF pilot are the Senegalese Government, the National Climate Change Com-
mittee (COMNACC), ASER, and are supported by the World Bank.
In Rwanda, the SCF builds on the Inyenyeri improved cookstove program, 
whereby key stakeholders involved include the Rwanda Environment Man-
agement Authority (REMA), the Ministry of Environment (MoE), Inyenyeri (the 
project developer), and are supported by the World Bank. 
While the Ci-Dev PoAs continue to operate under the CDM in both host 
countries, the SCF operates as a simulation in parallel to the programs’ CDM 
validation and registration to enable a direct comparison between the two 
approaches, including their costs and timelines, institutional set-up, and 
stakeholder engagement. Once the piloting phase comes to an end, Senegal, 
Rwanda and Ci-Dev will evaluate the lessons learned and may decide to shift 
the basis of their contractual arrangements from the CDM to the SCF. The SCF 
may in this case enable the transaction of ITMOs. 
The Senegalese SCF Pilot already provides lessons to inform this process69. 
Overall, significant time and costs savings can already be observed, including 
for example, the SCF program preparation and duration in Senegal requiring 
circa 2.9 months, whereas this is circa 68.7 months under the CDM. As well, 
the registration and listing phase for the Senegalese SCF Pilot entailed circa 
1.1 months, compared to 7.1 months under the CDM. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
The SCF is intended as instrument neutral, which means that its form of coop-
eration is flexible. The concept itself could fit under both Article 6.2 cooper-
ative approaches and/or the Article 6.4 market mechanism. Whereas under 
Article 6.2 partnering countries can decide on a cooperative approach con-
sistent with emerging Article 6 guidance and make use of SCF projects and 
programs, under Article 6.4, the Supervisory Body would need to consider 
and approve the SCF crediting approach as part of the crediting mechanism 
guidelines. The SCF approach could also function through results-based cli-
mate finance (RBCF). 
Therefore, should the SCF become internationally recognized as a transi-
tion tool and should its pilot activities meet the emerging guidance and 
requirements under Article 6, the rural electrification program in Senegal 
69 Diouf, Madeleine, Ousmane Fall Sarr, 
Harikumar Gadde. Operationalizing Article 6: 
A Standardiz ed Crediting Framework for the 
Post-2020 World. 2018
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and the cookstove program in Rwanda could transition to either Article 6.2 
or Article 6.4.
TRANSACTION SET-UP AND RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE NDC 
While SCF does not come with a specific allocation of emission reductions 
between host Parties and the acquiring Party, it paves the way for the host 
country to assess such transactions and creates an institutional framework 
for doing so at national level. The extent to which emission reductions units 
from the SCF pilot projects in Senegal and Rwanda will contribute to their 
NDC targets will become clearer after the pilot phase and once the crediting 
process can start. Similarly, once Article 6 is operational, the governments 
will have to decide what volume of SCF generated emission reductions will be 
transferred internationally and how much will be dedicated to reaching the 
country’s own NDC targets. The principle would be that transferred emission 
reductions should come from mitigation activities that are beyond the coun-
try’s unconditional NDC commitments.
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WORLD BANK: 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
CARBON ASSET FACILITY 
The Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF) is an initiative developed 
by the World Bank and in partnership with several contributing countries to 
support developing countries in increasing their NDC ambition, specifically 
through enabling developing countries to generate and sell carbon credits 
from enhanced climate action. TCAF aims to support the implementation of 
upscaled crediting options by developing baselines and monitoring the per-
formance of the selected sectoral or policy interventions70. It also aims to test 
various methods to transfer measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation 
outcomes between parties and to provide stringent accounting and transpar-
ency to ensure environmental integrity. Official pilot activities have not been 
announced by the program yet, as TCAF continues to be in the process of 
selecting programs to be endorsed. 
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Any sector linked to the mitigation goals of the host country’s NDC 
(excluding forestry and fossil fuel related activities).
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
World Bank; Donor countries: Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom; Recipients of funding and support: Developing 
countries.71 
Overall resources 
available (million $)
USD 200 million, with the aim to increase funding to USD 500 million.
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
The pilot has been designed as instrument-neutral: recognition of mitiga-
tion outcomes could happen under Article 6.2 or Article 6.4.
Relationship to NDC
Contribution to the achievement of the host country NDC. Baselines are 
derived from unconditional elements of NDCs.
Volume and price of 
ITMOs 
Total volume of emission reduction targeted for purchase by TCAF is 
around five million tCO2e. Average size of the programs is 30-50 million 
USD in carbon payments; no specific information on the price per emis-
sion reduction unit is available. The TCAF aims to leverage other sources 
to finance 2 to 4 billion USD.
Sustainable 
development benefits 
TCAF programs will follow the WBG environmental and safeguard stan-
dards and consistency with the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). 
70 Department for 
Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy. 
Transformative 
Carbon Asset Facility 
(TCAF) Light Touch 
Review. January 2018.
71 Transformative 
Carbon Asset Facility 
(TCAF). About TCAF. 
2018
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KEY FACTS
TCAF aims to assist countries with implementing market-based carbon pric-
ing instruments and sectoral mitigation measures. The main objectives under 
the program are: 
•  to develop innovative carbon accounting methodologies to quantify emis-
sion reductions achieved by policies as well as economy/sector-wide 
programs;
•  to create favorable conditions for private sector investment while inform-
ing the development of standards and agreements for future carbon cred-
iting instruments and transfer of mitigation assets;
•  to explore accounting for emission reduction credits from various carbon 
pricing schemes, allowing for flexibility in market-based climate mitigation 
approaches and for countries to implement more ambitious carbon pric-
ing instruments and policies;
•  to generate carbon assets that have strong environmental integrity and a 
high likelihood of being eligible for use against NDC targets, using conser-
vative baselines and stringent monitoring and accounting practices; and
•  to purchase a portion of the carbon assets (mitigation outcomes) from the 
underlying programs and policies, while the remaining part will be allo-
cated to the host country. 
The key stakeholders are the World Bank, donor countries and the host coun-
tries. So far, the World Bank has mobilized around 200 million USD out of the 
target of 500 million USD and it is being funded by Germany, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the UK. These Donors aim to obtain carbon assets for 
international compliance, build the international architecture for the transfer 
of units, support development of domestic carbon pricing, and help to trans-
form GHG-intensive sectors in host countries. Developing countries utilize 
the fund to implement policies and/or sectoral mitigation mechanisms.
Donor countries set the priorities for the operational work program and pro-
vide guidance, including on portfolio and program selection criteria and the 
selection of independent third party auditors in cases where there is no inter-
national scheme that could certify the carbon credits. On an annual basis, 
donor countries approve the Facility’s upcoming work program and budget. 
Decisions are made on a consensual basis, to the extent possible. The Facility 
Board takes the final decisions on which programs will be included in the 
Facility’s portfolio along with the commercial terms associated with each 
emission reduction purchase agreement (ERPA).72
TCAF supported activities must meet additionality, meaning they would not 
be implemented in the selected sector/country without the incentive pro-
vided by TCAF. The program should also demonstrate transparently that it 
72 Swiss Confederation SECO. Transformative 
Carbon Asset Facility “A long-term predictable 
price on carbon is recognized as a necessary 
element in spurring climate change 
mitigation.”. March 2018. 
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enables the host country to increase its mitigation ambition or to enhance 
its implementation of mitigation actions and policies beyond what it would 
achieve on its own.  
TCAF will take into account both the recognition of verified emission reduc-
tions (VERs) under Article 6 for NDCs compliance and the provisions of 
results-based climate finance (RBCF). In doing so, TCAF is looking to increase 
the standards of safeguarding the environmental integrity of carbon markets. 
In terms of the RBCF provision, the initiative is developing a methodology to 
ensure that the volume of emission reductions attributed to TCAF is related 
to the support provided to enable the activity73. 
The Methodologies and MRV systems are to be developed in a bottom up 
process for each pilot, whereby only high level “core parameters” will exist. 
TCAF‘s MRV approach is aligned (accounting methodology, computer systems, 
among others) with host countries‘ national MRV systems. On this basis, TCAF 
can make a valuable contribution to building MRV capacities on the national 
level. Sectoral-level MRV can build on existing MRV methodologies developed 
under the CDM and JI, where appropriate and relevant.
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
While TCAF’s aim is to purchase VERs that would be recognized under Article 
6, its intended form of cooperation is yet to be defined and could potentially 
fall under either Article 6.2 or 6.4.  
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
TCAF will test various methods to transfer mitigation outcomes between 
parties and provide stringent accounting and transparency to ensure the 
environmental integrity of the assets. The aim is to set parameters for each 
individual operation, including: the length of the crediting period (i.e. five to 
seven years), the share of emission reductions achieved to be purchased by 
TCAF (crediting threshold), and pricing. The share of emission reductions pur-
chased by TCAF varies and is specific to each operation, considering that TCAF 
operations aim to purchase volumes over the full crediting period for five 
million tCO²e.
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Currently, only TCAF donor reports from for instance, the UK75 or Switzerland76 
allow to gain an idea of its activity pipeline. Of the initially nine submitted 
activities, now three to five – including an energy efficiency programme for 
household appliances in Indian cities and energy pricing reform, energy effi-
ciency, and renewable energy policies within the scope of Morocco’s National 
Energy Strategy – seem to be under serious consideration.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
TCAF will have to be linked directly to the host country’s NDC as well as 
related policies and priorities. This ensures that the TCAF is contributing to 
73 World Bank. Core parameters for TCAF 
operations. July 2018.
74 World Bank. Core parameters for TCAF 
operations. July 2018. 
75 See above
76 Climate Cent Foundation (2018): 2017/18 
Report on the Climate Cent Foundation’s 
Allocation of Resources for the attention of 
the Federal Department of the Environment, 
Transport, Energy, and Communications 
(DETEC) in compliance with the agreement 
dated 19 September 2016, Zurich
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the achievement of the mitigation goals and increasing NDC ambition. TCAF 
adheres to 8 main criteria for its portfolio selection, including:77 
1.  coherence with national mitigation aims, by being consistent with or 
derived from the country’s NDC and aligned with domestic policies and 
priorities;
2. support increased domestic ambition;
3.  programs that achieve a lasting impact, which can become self-sustaining 
after the Facility’s support ends; 
4.  programs have demonstrable sustainable development co-benefits and 
maintain environmental and social safeguard standards;
5.  high level of environmental integrity of emissions reductions, consistently 
with the evolving framework and principles of UNFCCC rules at the time of 
implementation or ERPA signature; 
6.  avoidance of distortions to the sector’s international competitiveness and 
adverse incentives on the sector’s GHG emission; 
7. use of a robust baseline for the program; and
8.  readiness for implementation, preferably with generation of emission 
reductions beginning by 2020.
For each activity supported by TCAF the respective BAU emission trajectory 
will be compared with the unconditional target of a country’s NDC emission 
trajectory. Whenever the target emission trajectory is below the BAU, the 
target emission trajectory will be the baseline, otherwise the BAU emission 
trajectory will be used. The diversity of NDCs of TCAF host countries means 
it requires a flexible approach and tailored for each TCAF operation. TCAF 
recognizes the importance of avoiding double counting, nevertheless the 
program does not have an established process to fully tackle this issue yet. 
77 World Bank. Core parameters for TCAF 
operations. July 2018. 
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WORLD BANK:  
THE WAREHOUSE FACILITY
A GLOBAL WAREHOUSE FOR MITIGATION 
OUTCOMES 
The World Bank’s Warehouse Facility aims to ‘host’ an infrastructure for the 
standardized assessment, recording and transferring of mitigation outcomes 
from its lending pipeline and can be expanded to other multilateral devel-
opment banks operations. This intends to provide a platform that matches 
mitigation activities with potential buyers. 
KEY FACTS
The World Bank’s Warehouse Facility is currently being developed as an 
online platform that aims to house a database of mitigation activities, and 
make these accessible to potential investors wanting to purchase mitigation 
outcomes. Mitigation outcomes are seen as assets that will be monitored, 
verified and either counted towards the NDC at the place of implementation, 
retired or transferred through a corresponding adjustment. The Warehouse 
would allow mitigation projects to showcase these outcomes and benefits. 
The mitigation outcomes that would be made available via the Warehouse 
are sourced not only from World Bank operations, but also other MDBs and 
possibly private entities in order to provide access to a variety of activities for 
a variety of investors. To enable the operation of this market and to ensure 
the robustness of the mitigation outcomes, a Mitigation Action Assessment 
Protocol (MAAP) is also being developed. The MAAP tool aims to provide stan-
dardization for evaluating the ambition levels, environmental integrity as well 
as the compatibility of mitigation activities and is expected to support actual 
transactions of mitigation outcomes.
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
In its current concept, the MO market infrastructure would consist of three 
elements:
1. Development of Mitigation Assets from lending operations
2. Warehouse
3.  Transaction Facility to steer demand for MO transfers through financial 
instruments and products
77 
Starting with its own lending operations around the globe, the World Bank is 
expecting a capacity building effect to translate into a wider domestic Article 
6 market readiness. The Warehouse Facility is still at the early stages of devel-
opment, meaning the platform is not yet accessible. However, the first pilot 
country funds related to the Warehouse are planned for 2019, with a gradual 
scale up of the market infrastructure by 2021.
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Figure 7: World Bank, Creating Climate Markets; presentation at 
the Global DNA Forum in Bonn; September 21st, 2018.
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ANNEX II:  OTHER
RELEVANT INITIATIVES 
EU and Switzerland
ETS linking in the context of 
NDC targets
The linking of the EU and Swiss ETS 
is a form of voluntary cooperation 
that can align with Article 6.2 guid-
ance of the Paris Agreement
REDD+ initiatives
REDD+ initiatives could eventually 
be integrated into or aligned with 
Article 6 cooperative approaches, 
however, this has not been specifi-
cally implicated yet
80 
ETS LINKING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF NDC TARGETS
An Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a market approach that puts a price on 
carbon by fixing the amount of GHG emissions from covered sectors. The ETS 
regulator caps the volume of emissions that entities, covered by the scheme, 
are allowed to emit in each trading period, thereby incentivizing emission 
reductions. Instead of reducing their own emissions, entities may also buy 
emission allowances from other covered entities who are able to reduce 
emissions quicker or at a lower price. 
The European Union has an operational ETS since 2005 and Switzerland 
started its ETS in 2008. After a 7-year negotiation period, in 2017 Switzerland 
and the EU concluded their negotiations to link the two systems. The linkage, 
however, is not operational as of yet and is expected to start in 2020.
The linking of the EU and Swiss ETS is a form of voluntary cooperation that 
can align with Article 6.2 guidance of the Paris Agreement. Emission reduc-
tions are expected to flow between these jurisdictions resulting in interna-
tional transfer of mitigation outcomes. As both jurisdictions are using emis-
sion trading to achieve NDC targets,78 accounting for ITMOs is a key element 
in the cooperative design. 
KEY FACTS
The Swiss ETS is the first system to be linked to the EU ETS. From the Swiss 
perspective, the linkage considerably expands their carbon market by adding 
approximately 11,000 installations covered by the EU ETS to the 50 companies 
covered by the Swiss ETS. As such, linking is expected to lead to cost efficiency 
and increased market liquidity, and to contribute to an even playing field that 
reduces carbon leakage.79 Moreover, Switzerland has stated that access to 
the EU market is expected to give Swiss companies greater flexibility in meet-
ing its CO2 targets.80 For the EU, which currently operates the largest ETS in 
the world, expanding its market through linkage is considered a political sig-
nal towards its commitment to achieving its Paris Agreement objectives, and 
a way to promote global leadership on carbon pricing policies.81
To ensure compatibility between the EU and Swiss ETS, a number of design 
elements of the Swiss ETS have been revisited. For example, the scope of the 
Swiss ETS was expanded to include the aviation and power sector. Similarly, 
the rules on the use of offsets have been aligned with the EU offsetting rules. 
In addition, the EU-Swiss Linking Agreement establishes a Joint Committee 
78 The sectors covered by the EU and Swiss 
ETS are also part of the EU and Swiss NDC, 
with the exception of aviation which is 
excluded from the Swiss mitigation pledge as 
long as no internationally applicable rules for 
the international aviation and shipping sector 
are applied.  
79 Santikarn, M., Li, L., La Hoz Theuer, S., 
Haug, C. A Guide to Linking Emissions Trading 
Systems. ICAP: Berlin. 2018. 
80 Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) 
Linking the Swiss and EU emissions trading 
schemes. 2018. 
81 European Commission. EU and Switzerland 
sign agreement to link emissions trading 
systems. 2017. 
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which is to ensure proper implementation of the Linking Agreement.82 The EU 
and Switzerland will, however, continue to run separate auctions. 
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
Linking ETSs between jurisdictions is a form of Art. 6.2 cooperation under 
the Paris Agreement, as it is designed to make mitigation outcomes flow 
across borders as they are traded between entities covered under either of 
the schemes. The international transfer of mitigation outcomes through link-
age requires the EU and Switzerland to consider how this is accounted for 
towards their respective NDCs. Accounting will need to ensure that the emis-
sion allowances are reported properly at the national level, and that they are 
counted towards only one NDC target. The EU-Swiss Linking Agreement sets 
out that both Switzerland and the EU will account for the flow of allowances 
‘in accordance with UNFCCC approved principles and rules for accounting’ 
once these enter into force.83 As such, accounting is set out to comply with 
the Art. 6.2 guidance. The mechanics of how to do this will be determined at 
a later stage and added to the Linking Agreement as an Annex. 
82 Agreement between the European Union 
and the Swiss Confederation on the linking 
of their greenhouse gas emissions trading 
systems. Official Journal of the European 
Union. L. 322/3. 7 December 2017. Article 13.
83 Agreement between the European Union 
and the Swiss Confederation on the linking 
of their greenhouse gas emissions trading 
systems. Official Journal of the European 
Union. L. 322/3. 7 December 2017. Article 4.
84 After linkage between the Ontario, Quebec 
and California cap-and-trade systems came 
into effect on 1 January 2018, the Ontario 
government revoked its cap-and-trade 
regulation on July 3, 2018, suspending all 
Ontario entity CITSS accounts. 
85 Santikarn, M., Li, L., La Hoz Theuer, S., 
Haug, C. A Guide to Linking Emissions Trading 
Systems. ICAP: Berlin. 2018.
Box: Linking sub-national ETS 
The potential linkage between the California, Quebec and Ontario84 cap-
and-trade represents a slightly different situation where ETSs developed 
and implemented at subnational level would be linked across countries. 
As international cooperation under Article 6 requires that the use of 
ITMOs against NDCs be authorized by the participating Parties, the 
linking of these subnational initiatives will require the respective Party 
authorization. With the potential US withdrawal of the Paris Agreement, 
authorization for the participation of California in Article 6 might be 
compromised. 
In addition, if and once the US withdrawal materializes, the US will not 
be bound to any Paris-related obligations. It is worth noting that, even 
when international cooperation takes place between sub-national enti-
ties, the international accounting and reporting obligations ultimately 
remain with the respective national governments (as only Parties have 
obligations under the Paris Agreement). 
Yet another situation arises when two sub-national systems within the 
same jurisdiction are linked. Here, countries may decide themselves 
whether to reflect these flows in their NDC accounting and reporting.85
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REDD+ INITIATIVES
Currently, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD+) initiatives are not covered under Article 6. As the negotiations are 
not yet finalized, REDD+ could eventually be integrated into or aligned with 
Article 6 cooperative approaches. While to this date no specific REDD+ initia-
tive has explicitly indicated its intent to be recognized as an Article 6 pilot, a 
number of multilateral and bilateral initiatives exist that can lay the technical 
ground for future REDD+ piloting.
SUMMARY TABLE
Specific sectors and 
technologies
Land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) and REDD+
Possible stakeholders 
and participants
Parties, multilateral and bilateral organiza-
tions, and non-state actors  
Relationship to NDC
If LULUCF is included within the scope 
of the NDC, and if REDD+ activities are 
able to generate ITMOs, double counting 
must be avoided through corresponding 
adjustments.
Form of Article 6 
cooperation
N/A
Volume and price of 
ITMOs 
N/A
Sustainable 
development benefits
REDD+ has the potential to deliver social and 
environmental benefits beyond GHG emis-
sion reductions. These include biodiversity 
habitat, flood prevention and other environ-
mental services provided by forests. Differ-
ent standards that measure these sustain-
able development benefits may be coupled 
with REDD+.  
REDD+ sets out a number of safeguards 
that should be promoted and supported by 
REDD+ projects, including the conservation 
of natural forests and biological diversity 
and the participation of relevant stakehold-
ers, in particular indigenous peoples and 
local communities
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KEY FACTS
REDD+ is operationalized by the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (‘WFR’), a 
collection of seven decisions86 that set out the ‘rulebook’ for REDD+ imple-
mentation. The WFR includes Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (‘MRV’) 
requirements, emission reference levels, financing and results-based pay-
ment structures, and institutional arrangements. 
The Paris Agreement explicitly refers to REDD+ and the WFR in its Article 5.87 It 
is currently unclear whether REDD+ will be eligible under Article 6, given that 
it is covered in a separate Article. 
Both Article 5 of the Paris Agreement and the WFR seek to incentivize emis-
sion reductions by REDD+ through results-based payments, based on the 
actual volume of reduced emissions. Funding for results-based payments 
under REDD+ has been pledged and disbursed through multilateral and bilat-
eral sources. 
Multilateral funds include, among others, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
which is implementing a five-year pilot funding REDD+ results-based pay-
ments; the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Bio Carbon 
Fund, two World Bank initiatives dedicated to results-based finance through 
the purchase of verified emissions reductions; and the UN-REDD Programme 
that focuses on supporting the design and implementation of national REDD+ 
programs. Large bilateral programs that fund REDD+ results-based payments 
are the German REDD Early Movers Program, and Norway’s International Cli-
mate and Forest Initiative. 
Significant REDD+ accounting guidance is provided by the WFR and the afore-
mentioned multilateral and bilateral initiatives. This includes detailed guid-
ance and technical consideration of national and large-scale subnational a 
forest reference emissions level or forest reference level (FREL/FRL), MRV 
procedures, mechanisms for dealing with non-permanence of emission 
reductions and leakage, as well as social and environmental safeguards.    
INTENDED FORM OF COOPERATION 
While REDD+ is designed under the UNFCCC as a mechanism for results-
based payments, where the ownership of ERs remains with (or within) the 
host country, COP decisions do not rule out the use of carbon markets.88 In 
this context, it is also conceivable that Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris Agreement 
be used to establish bilateral or plurilateral REDD+ cooperative approaches 
that rely on the transfer of REDD+ mitigation outcomes between countries.
As Article 6.2 allows for a broad range of initiatives and provides Parties with 
greater discretion to determine their own terms for cooperation, REDD+ 
activities may eventually be able to generate emission reductions recognised 
as ITMOs. The combination of REDD+ and Article 6.2 may require the appli-
cation of additional accounting and quality criteria going beyond WFR rules.89 
86 UNFCCC. Warsaw Framework. Decisions 
9-15 /CP.19. November 2013.  
87 UNFCCC. Paris Agreement. Article 5. FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
88 In Warsaw, COP19 highlighted that 
additional verif ication modalities might be 
needed if markets are used, thereby creating 
an entry-point to the potential use of carbon 
markets to f inance REDD+ under the climate 
regime. See Decision 14/CP.19 para 15
89 Streck, C. Howard, A. Rajão, R. Options 
for Enhancing REDD+ Collaboration in the 
Context of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. 
Meridian Institute. 2017
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Such criteria may include, for instance, agreed third party verification and 
auditing for evaluating reference levels and monitored emission reductions.90 
The methodological guidance for NDCs further requires countries to provide 
a description of methodological assumptions and the accounting approach 
that guide the estimation and accounting for GHG emissions and removals 
for all cooperative approaches. 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDC 
For those host countries that have included the forestry sector in the scope 
of their NDCs, an international transfer of REDD+ outcomes post-2020 can 
affect their capacity to achieve their domestic mitigation pledges. To mitigate 
the risk of non-NDC achievement by overselling, host-countries need to have 
capacities in place to carefully manage their emission reduction portfolio. A 
timely decision regarding which emission reductions – if any – host countries 
are willing to trade for international support, is therefore important. 
In this context, the FCPF already considers the use of national registries or 
a centralized registry to create and transfer emission reductions produced 
in accordance with the FCPF Methodological Framework.91 The FCPF is also 
considering introducing a verification process for REDD+ emission reductions 
that is risk-based and developed independently by an auditing firm. This con-
trasts with the approach adopted so far by the FCPF Technical Advisory Panel 
(TAP) for the assessment and validation of REDD+ programs. The TAP pro-
vides recommendations and is comprised of experts that do not necessarily 
have auditing expertise.92    
TRANSACTIONAL SET-UP 
The FCPF for instance, foresees the international transfers of emission reduc-
tions from REDD+ programs. The so-called Tranche A participants in the FCPF 
Carbon Fund may use REDD+ emission reductions for compliance with reg-
ulations or other measures or may resell them. In turn, for Tranche B partic-
ipants, the use of REDD+ emission reductions are restricted, with no use for 
compliance or resale allowed.93 
The transaction is intermediated by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) as a trustee of the FCPF Carbon Fund. The 
IBRD enters into an Emission Reductions Payment Agreement (ERPA) with 
the REDD+ country, where it establishes a detailed set of general conditions 
for purchasing the emission reductions, obtaining title over these, and then 
making agreed payments to the REDD+ countries.94 
These REDD+ transactional aspects may have a number of implications if Arti-
cle 6 alignment is pursued. For instance, the use of these REDD+ emission 
reductions against NDC targets, if allowed, would require that all emerging 
guidance related to the features of ITMOs, corresponding adjustments, and 
country’s participation responsibilities are met by the REDD+ country and the 
Tranche A country.
90 Streck, C. Howard, A. Rajão, R. Options 
for Enhancing REDD+ Collaboration in the 
Context of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. 
Meridian Institute. 2017
91 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Carbon 
Fund Methodological Framework. June 22, 
2016. Para 6.2.
92 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. 
Guidance on ER-PD technical assessment 
process. Version 2. March 2018 
93 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Double 
Counting under ERPA General Conditions. 
FCPF Carbon Fund Meeting (CF12). April 28-
30, 2015
94 IBRD. General Conditions Applicable to 
Emission Reductions Payment Agreements for 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Emission 
Reductions Programs. November 1, 2014
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